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Abstract
The traditional linear production system where products are created, used, and then
disposed of is no longer a viable business model for many firms. A combination of
growing populations, increases in consumerism, and urbanization are placing unprece-
dented pressures on our world’s natural resources. In addition to these motivations,
strong demands from consumers and governments are requiring companies to reeval-
uate and prioritize their environmental strategies. Fortunately, there are several
opportunities for firms to engage in more sustainable business practices throughout
their entire supply chain, particularly at the end of their products’ useful lives. How-
ever, moving from a linear model to a more closed-loop production system where
products are recovered and reused brings a host of operational challenges, some of
which remain unaddressed by the current literature.
In this dissertation, we examine a series of common, operations-related issues
firms and government agencies face when pursuing sustainable waste management
practices. In the first essay, we evaluate noted barriers operations managers face when
entering the market for refurbished products. In the second study, we analyze the
effectiveness of environmental legislation and consumer education efforts in promoting
product reuse and recycling. In the last essay, we develop a robust consumer returns
forecasting model to aid operations managers in their inventory, reverse logistics,
and return recovery decisions. In addition to academic contributions, the results
from these studies offer practitioners guidance needed to facilitate the transition to
more circular production models and increase the number of sustainable, operations-
enabled opportunities for reducing product waste.
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The traditional linear production system where products are created, used, and then
disposed of is no longer a viable business model for many firms. A combination
of growing populations, increases in consumerism, and urbanization are placing un-
precedented pressures on our world’s natural resources. For example, since 1980 the
amount of raw materials extracted and consumed globally has increased by 60% to
over 62 billion metric tons (OECD, 2017). Furthermore, rapid increases in post-
consumer waste are accelerating the threat of non-sustainable development and a
potential global waste crisis. Although recycling rates have improved, the majority
of waste in most developed countries is still sent to landfills (OECD, 2015). Last, in
addition to the threats of resource scarcity and vast pollution, strong demands from
consumers and governments are motivating firms to reevaluate their environmental
strategies (Atasu, 2016; Macarthur-Foundation, 2013).
Fortunately, there are several opportunities for firms to engage in more sustainable
business practices throughout their entire supply chain — particularly at the end of
their products’ useful lives (see Figure 1.11). The EPA has identified and ranked var-
ious waste management strategies from most to least environmentally preferred, and
the hierarchy places emphasis on reducing, reusing, and recycling as key to sustainable
materials management (EPA.gov, 2016). However, moving from a linear model to a
more closed loop production system where products are recovered and reused brings a
host of operational challenges, some of which remain unaddressed by the current sus-
1Figure source: https://connect.innovateuk.org
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tainable operations literature (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Examples include
navigating environmental regulations, managing reverse supply chain complexity, and
understanding market competition and consumer preferences for reused goods (Guide
and Van Wassenhove, 2009; Atasu and Wassenhove, 2012; Agrawal et al., 2015). As
noted by both industry and academic sources, additional research is needed in these
areas to maximize firms’ future economic and environmental performance (OECD,
2017; Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2009).
Figure 1.1: The Linear and Closed Loop Supply Chain
In response, in this dissertation we address a series of operations-related challenges
firms and government agencies face in implementing sustainable waste management
practices. As shown in Figure 2.3 and discussed below, we use the EPA’s 3R hi-
erarchy as a framework for our studies. In Chapter 2, we explore opportunities to
promote product reuse through remanufacturing. We note that many companies are
reluctant to enter the remanufacturing market because of concern with cannibaliza-
tion of new sales, competition from current remanufacturers, and the willingness of
consumers to purchase remanufactured products. What is often missing, however,
2
is an in-depth understanding of how consumers make complex purchase decisions
involving remanufactured items among numerous other options. Thus, this paper
examines how consumers evaluate remanufactured products when there are multiple
conditions and generations of the item available, and evaluates the risk that remanu-
factured products pose to new product sales. We leverage transaction data from eBay
and structural estimation techniques developed in the industrial organization litera-
ture to conduct our analysis. We find that product generation, condition, and seller
attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions, and
that the relationship between new and remanufactured products is much more nu-
anced and context-specific than previously thought. Counter to industry intuition, we
find that remanufactured products pose the same amount of threat to new-condition
goods as do used goods. Through these and other findings, we provide insights on
how CLSC participants and those exploring entry into the remanufacturing business
may achieve more profitable remanufacturing strategies.
Figure 1.2: Summary of Dissertation Essays
In the Chapter 3, we analyze the effectiveness of legislative tools and consumer
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education efforts in promoting product recycling. To protect public health and the
environment, several states in the US have adopted various forms of legislation for
electronic waste. It has been argued, however, that such legislation is ineffective and,
in some cases, lays too heavy a responsibility on manufacturers when consumer be-
havior is actually the key to recycling success. Although both consumer attributes
and legislation seem likely to impact e-recycling, a lack of empirical data has limited
firms’ and legislators’ ability to assess the true impact of these factors. In this study,
we quantify how recycling and reuse activities are shaped by consumer attributes and
two popular forms of state-level e-waste legislation: extended producer responsibility
(EPR) and landfill bans. To study our research questions, we leverage consumer sur-
vey data that details recycling activities in states with and without EPR policies and
landfill bans for e-waste. We find, as expected, that in states with EPR legislation,
consumers are more likely to recycle their electronic waste. Perhaps less intuitively,
we find that consumers’ knowledge of landfill bans increases their likelihood to store
their electronics rather than recycle them. Lastly, we confirm that the biggest de-
terrents to consumer recycling are not knowing where to recycle electronic products,
and inconvenient recycling locations. Through these and other observations, we pro-
vide insights on how administrators of recycling programs can best leverage e-waste
legislation and structure consumer education efforts to maximize consumer e-waste
recycling.
In the Chapter 4, we develop a robust consumer returns forecasting model to
aid operations managers in inventory, reverse logistics, and return recovery decisions.
In recent years, offering a generous return policy has become increasingly popular
among U.S. retailers eager to win sales. Although lenient return policies have been
shown to have marketing benefits such as a higher willingness to pay and a higher
purchase frequency, counterbalancing these benefits with an increased volumes of re-
turns presents operational challenges for both retailers and original equipment manu-
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facturers (OEMs). To better manage consumer returns, operations managers need an
accurate return forecast as an input into their strategic and tactical tools. We propose
a consumer return forecasting framework and test our model on datasets provided by
brick-and-mortar and online retailers. By more effectively utilizing transaction-level
data such as purchase and return timestamps, our basic model demonstrates fore-
casting error reduction over benchmark models constructed from common industry
practice and existing literature. We find that the reduction in forecasting error is
likely more pronounced for product categories that have more variable return rates
and less variability in average time-to-return durations. Such forecast accuracy im-
provement has broad implications for inventory, staffing, reverse logistics, and return
recovery decisions.
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of findings and future research directions. In
addition to academic contributions, the results from these studies offer practitioners
guidance needed to facilitate the transition to more circular production models and




How do Consumers Choose Between Multiple
Product Generations and Conditions? An
Empirical Study of iPad Sales on eBay
2.1 Introduction and Motivation
Advances in technology, coupled with firms’ needs for sustainable business practices,
have resulted in the growth of industries that can deliver both economic and envi-
ronmental value. One such industry, for which annual production exceeds $43 billion
in the U.S. alone, is the remanufacturing sector (Ward, 2014; MSNBC, 2014).
Remanufacturing is an extensive, industrial process that restores goods to their
original working condition (USITC, 2012a). The remanufacturing process is executed
by participants of closed loop supply chains (CLSC) and offers wide-ranging bene-
fits to the environment (reduced raw material and energy consumption), producers
(average profit margins often exceed 20%), and consumers (lower prices and product
failure rates) (Guide and Wassenhove, 2001).
Remanufactured products are sometimes referred to as “refurbished” in the mar-
ketplace and we will use these two terms interchangeably in this paper. Furthermore,
remanufactured products are typically sold at a discount relative to the price of a new
product but are often more expensive than used products. (Ferguson, 2010). We re-
fer to New, Remanufactured, and Used as the product “conditions” of interest in this
paper (subject to some additional sub-categorization, as explained in Section 3), with
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the understanding that the physical condition (although not the consumer percep-
tion) might be identical in some cases across these categories (e.g. Remanufactured
vs. New).
Despite the demonstrated economic and subsequent environmental benefits, it is
surprising that the remanufacturing industry remains underdeveloped with signifi-
cant opportunities for growth (Hagerty and Glader, 2011). Remanufacturing inten-
sity, measured as the ratio of remanufacturing to total manufacturing production, is
“still small” (USITC, 2012b), p.1) and accounts for only 2% of the total $2.1 trillion
manufacturing industry (USITC, 2012a). To better understand why remanufacturing
is not more widespread, practitioners and academics have focused on isolating key
issues and opportunities within the sector (see for example, Guide and Wassenhove
(2001) Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009), and Souza (2013a)). As noted in this
literature, both original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and third-parties are re-
luctant to enter the remanufacturing market because of concern with cannibalization
of new sales and competition from current remanufacturers. These threats, while the-
oretically viable, are based on speculation as opposed to empirical evidence. Still, in
response to the threat of cannibalization and competition, OEMs have been reported
to discourage remanufacturing through actions such as copyrighting repair manu-
als (Turner, 2016) and launching aggressive core destruction programs disguised as
“recycling” tactics (USITC, 2012a).
Even beyond the fear of competition, firms are uncertain of how to promote re-
manufactured products, and fear that these goods will not be accepted by consumers
in the marketplace. For example, the United States International Trade Commission
(USITC) surveyed over 2,900 remanufacturers and reported that the (1) relative price
of remanufactured goods to new goods and (2) consumers’ perceptions remanufac-
tured products were some of the top factors known to influence demand for remanu-
factured products (USITC, 2012a). However, the specific effects and consequences of
7
price and consumers’ perceptions were observed to be poorly understood by survey
participants (USITC, 2012a).
Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009) summarize the effects of the discussed canni-
balization, competition, and consumer acceptance concerns in their overview of the
CLSC literature by noting that “if prices and markets are not fully understood, they
become barriers to fully unleashing the value potential of CLSCs, no matter how
well the operational system is designed.” Therefore, in this paper we examine how
consumers evaluate remanufactured products when there are multiple conditions and
generations of the item available, and directly evaluate the risk that remanufactured
products pose to new product sales. Specifically, we examine the relative effect of
product (price, presence of warranty, return policy) and seller related (reputation
score) attributes on consumers’ choices for different conditions (New, Refurbished,
Used) and different generations of a product.
Our study builds on a recent stream of work exploring how key factors such as
brand equity (Abbey et al., 2015) and seller identity (Agrawal et al., 2015) influence
consumers’ attitudes and willingness to pay for remanufactured products; please see
section 2 for a thorough review of this literature. Most papers in this stream compare
consumers’ behavior when faced with a simple binary choice: a new product or a re-
furbished version of that same product. In practice, however, consumers’ preferences
for refurbished products may be shaped by a dramatically wider selection of goods,
including used-condition products. Further, the growth of online secondary markets
has resulted in multiple generations of products being offered at the same time. For
example, on Amazon.com, consumers shopping for iPads may choose between four
generations (iPad 1 - iPad 4) and three conditions (New, Used, and Refurbished) of
iPads. Additionally, consumers may choose between sellers with different consumer
ratings and return policy offerings. Figure 2.1 shows iPad listings on WalMart.com,
which similarly offers refurbished goods alongside multiple conditions and genera-
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tions of the same products. Overall, our study includes a much broader choice set
than those represented in previous studies, as shown in Figure 2.2. By analyzing the
relative effects of noted product and seller related variables on consumers’ choices,
we extend the previous research by conducting a more direct examination of the
cannibalization effect between product conditions and generations.
Figure 2.1: Example of Consumer Choices on WalMart.com
As described in detail in section 3, we focus our study on sales of iPads. Like many
consumer electronics, iPads experience rapid growth and product design changes,
leading to shorter life cycles and a growing number of products needing appropriate
end-of-life management (EPA.gov, 2016). In addition, the presence of substances of
concern in some electronics - such as lead, mercury, and chlorine - merit greater con-
sideration for safe end-of-life management (Gayle, 2012). Remanufacturing provides
a preferred alternative to these products being thrown away and consequently con-
tributing to e-waste, and often provides a higher value recovery option than recycling
(EPA.gov, 2016).
We leverage transaction data from eBay and structural estimation techniques de-
veloped in the empirical industrial organization literature to conduct our analysis
(Berry, 1994). Our analysis method allows us to better understand why a consumer
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of Current Study Choice Set (prices shown are
for illustrative purposes only)
makes a particular choice and how the consumer analyzes trade-offs among the at-
tributes of the choices. We provide a preview of our main results here. We find
that product generation, condition, and seller attributes are all highly influential
in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions, and that the relationship between new
and refurbished products is much more nuanced and context-specific than previously
thought. Our results suggest that changes in Manufacturer 3P Certified products
prices threaten the market share of New and New Open-Box approximately three
times more than changes in Seller Refurbished products prices. Surprisingly, we
find that remanufactured products pose the same amount of threat to New-condition
goods as do Used goods. This finding runs counter to most existing industry intuition,
where original equipment manufacturers fear cannibalization much more from reman-
ufactured products than from used products. Through these and other observations,
we provide insights on how CLSC participants and those exploring entry into the
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remanufacturing business may achieve more profitable remanufacturing strategies.
2.2 Literature Review
There are two streams of literature that are particularly relevant to our research. The
first stream includes an emerging group of studies that explore market development
issues of CLSCs. The second relates the growing application of our methodological
approach, structural estimation modeling, to the operations literature.
2.2.1 How consumers choose between new and remanufactured products
Although companies that manage used electronics have existed for years, the mar-
ket for refurbished goods has expanded rapidly as of late. The resulting concurrent
availability of new, used, and refurbished goods, and the overlap of successive prod-
uct generations, has raised several concerns about the potential for cannibalization
and consumer acceptance of remanufactured products. In response, an emerging
stream of literature has considered how consumers choose between new and reman-
ufactured products, as shown in Figure 2.3. This set of papers can be classified
into two sub-categories according to their key conclusions. In the first subset, the au-
thors explore differences in consumers’ willingness to pay for new and remanufactured
products (Harms and Linton, 2015). Factors such as product category (Guide and Li,
2010), seller identity (Subramanian and Subramanyam, 2012; Agrawal et al., 2015),
seller reputation (Subramanian and Subramanyam, 2012), and competitive intensity
(Agrawal et al., 2015) are shown to influence the magnitude of these differences. A
mixture of field and behavioral experiments, secondary market data, and surveys are
leveraged in these studies.
In the second subset of studies, the authors identify factors that influence con-
sumers’ preferences for remanufactured products (Abbey et al., 2015), and the likeli-
hood of new product cannibalization (Ovchinnikov, 2011). These papers show that
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factors such as brand equity (Abbey et al., 2015), product quality (Ovchinnikov,
2011; Abbey et al., 2015), and price discount (Ovchinnikov, 2011; Abbey et al., 2015)
influence the utility of remanufactured products across product types and various
consumer segments. Both surveys and behavioral experiments are leveraged in these
studies. Overall, this stream of research provides insights on factors that influence 1)
consumers’ willingness to pay for products and 2) the attractiveness/utility of reman-
ufactured products. A summary of the factors studied across all empirical studies is
shown in Figure 2.4.
Stud ies A
Agrawal et al. 2014
•MP3 Player and Printer
• 573 Student Participants
• Guide and Li 2010
•Consumer & Commercial
Product
• 84 product auctions
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Figure 2.3: Empirical Studies in Closed Loop Supply Chains
The extant literature does not however, provide a clear understanding of how these
factors influence consumers’ preferences when choosing between multiple conditions
(New, Refurbished, and Used) and generations of the same product (as noted earlier,
a common choice set in practice). The effect of the remanufactured product’s price


































Figure 2.4: Effects of Noted Factors on Consumers’ Willingness
to Pay and Purchase Decisions
it is key to understanding the potential for cannibalization. As shown in Figure 2.3,
we help fill this gap in the literature by being the first to use revealed preference data
to calculate cross-price elasticities between product conditions and generations.
None of the studies mentioned above estimate the cross-price elasticities among
the products considered in the customer’s choice set. Cross-price elasticities provide
a cleaner measure of how changes in the price of one condition (or generation) affects
the demand of the other conditions (or generations). Further, this measure has been
leveraged in previous literature to evaluate product-level competition between used
and new-condition books (Ghose et al., 2006), CDs and DVDs (Smith and Telang,
2008), and successive generations of used-condition electronics (Elmaghraby et al.,
2015). These papers collectively show that the degree of cannibalization varies widely
by product type. For example, Smith and Telang (2008) find that the cross-price elas-
ticity of New product demand with respect to used product prices (and consequently
the potential for demand cannibalization) is far higher for CDs and DVDs than it is
for books (Ghose et al., 2006).
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2.2.2 Choice Modeling Techniques in Operations Management Literature
Increases in product options coupled with the accessibility of online marketplaces has
dramatically expanded the number of options available to buyers (see Jagabathula,
2011, p.10). Consequently, capturing consumer choice behavior has become increas-
ingly important to business managers (Garrow, 2016). Choice models, which allow
researchers to understand how a consumer evaluates the attributes of alternatives
within an offering, is one approach to studying such behavior. The discrete-choice
demand model stemming from McFadden (1978) and Manski and McFadden (1981)
random utility framework is, in particular, a widely-leveraged approach. The model
assumes that when offered a set of alternatives, an individual assigns a utility to each
attribute that influences their choice, then chooses the option that provides them
their maximum utility (Garrow, 2016). Further, the model assumes that the pur-
chase decisions of consumers are affected by the selection of products that a seller
offers. In the Operations literature, choice modeling techniques have been leveraged
extensively in a wide range of contexts. In retail operations, for example, researchers
have used these methods to assist with assortment planning (Rusmevichientong et al.,
2010; Kök and Xu, 2011; Li and Huh, 2011). In airline studies, they have been used to
determine the allocation of aircraft seat capacity to multiple fare classes (Garrow and
Koppelman, 2004; Adler et al., 2005; Vulcano et al., 2010). Last, in transportation
analyses, these techniques have been leveraged to predict how consumers will respond
to changes in existing and proposed transportation options (Lee and Waddell, 2010;
Pinjari et al., 2007, 2011).
Given the ubiquity of consumers’ choice behavior, several variants of discrete
choice models exist (Jagabathula, 2011, see: p.21). To perform our analyses, we
leverage the structural estimation technique introduced by Berry (1994) which allows
for the development of models of demand and supply equations. The Berry (1994)
and Berry et al. (1995) models were one of the first methods to estimate demand
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based on random utility maximization (RUM) models using aggregate market-level
sales data. In the recent Operations literature, the Berry structural estimation model
has been employed by Olivares et al. (2008) to study operating room staffing decisions,
Allon et al. (2011) to estimate the value of reducing customer wait times in the drive-
thru fast-food industry, and Guajardo et al. (2015) to examine how various product
and service attributes affect demand for U.S. automobiles. Similarly, we leverage the
model to understand how consumers’ choices for Refurbished products are affected
by seller and product related variables.
The Berry model distinctively assumes prices are endogenously determined by
firms. This is in contrast to existing empirical studies on this topic that assume
prices are exogenous. As the exogenous assumption has been recognized as an impor-
tant shortcoming in the literature (Berry, 1994), we develop instrumental variables
for price and nested market share using the sum of the other observations’ charac-
teristics (see section 5.1). Our findings indicate that when endogeneity is considered,
the coefficient of price is significantly more negative. Thus, from a methodological
perspective, we extend the previous research on this topic through explicitly dealing
with the endogeneity of prices.
2.3 Data
We leverage transaction data on fixed price listings of a well-understood and ubiqui-
tous product, Apple iPads, on eBay. It is estimated that 50 million iPads are sold
annually and over 350 million iPads have been sold to date.
At the time of our data collection, three versions of iPads were currently available
for sale on the site (and through retailers): iPad minis, iPad Airs, and classic iPads.
Our dataset includes multiple generations (1 through 4) of classic iPads. We limit
our sample to the classic iPads as this version had the largest number of transactions
and successive versions available.
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The eBay platform provides a useful data source for our research for multiple rea-
sons. First, the site allows consumers to choose between various conditions (i.e. New,
Used and Refurbished) and generations (1 through 4) of the classic iPad product.
Second, eBay supplies historical information on all completed transactions, which
can be readily collected by researchers. Last, the observed transactions exhibit suffi-
cient variation on price, warranty offerings, seller reputation and other key variables
of interest. Contrary to the auction format, with fixed price listings the sellers set
prices for their products and consumers choose whether to purchase a given product
at the stated price. Using this fixed price data, as opposed to auction results, allows
for a larger sample size as nearly 90% of iPads sold on eBay are offered through this
format. Additionally in practice, refurbished products are often sold by retailers (i.e.
Best Buy and Amazon) and OEMs (i.e. HP, Dell, and Bose) through a fixed-priced
format.
Our process for collecting data was as follows. On a monthly basis, our team
identified all iPad listings that were sold, unsold (termed “completed” by eBay),
and still active using eBay’s advanced search tool. We extracted data from all sold
product listings after applying two filters. First, we excluded all products offered
from international sellers. Second, we excluded all products from our searches that
were in non-working condition or that had severe defects/cosmetic issues. Listings
that met the above criteria were then added to a master database. Subsequently,
all viewable product and seller related variables were extracted from the identified
listings.
2.3.1 Product and Transaction Related Variables
On the main product-listing page, we extracted the information about the product’s
price, the date and time at which the product was sold, the condition of the prod-
uct, the return policy, shipping information (including shipping charges and shipping
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speed), and whether a warranty was offered with the product (Figure 2.5). Details
about each of these variables are provided below.
Condition. Five conditions of iPad products are observed in our dataset: New,
New Open-Box, Manufacturer Third-Party (3P) Certified Refurbished, Seller Re-
furbished, and Used. As defined by eBay, a New condition product is brand-new,
unused, and in its original packaging. A New Open-Box product is similar to New,
except the items’ original packaging may not be present. A Manufacturer 3P Certi-
fied Refurbished product has been inspected, cleaned, and repaired and restored to
a like—new condition (note the OEM does not actually do the refurbishing in the
case of iPads, rather a seller or “third-party” who has been certified by Apple). A
Seller Refurbished product is identical to a Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished
product, except that a non-certified party has restored the product. Last, a Used
condition product is fully operational, but may exhibit cosmetic signs of use and has
not been inspected by a third party or the OEM. We thus model CONDITION as
a categorical variable with a value set to 1 if the product is New, 2 if the product is
New Open-Box, 3 if the product is Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished, 4 if the
product is Seller Non-Certified Refurbished, and 5 if the product is Used.
Generation and Storage Size. Four generations of iPads with four different mem-
ory storage sizes are observed. We thus set our iPad GENERATION measure to 1
for iPad 1, 2 for iPad 2, 3 for iPad 3, and 4 for iPad 4. Our iPad SIZE measure is
modeled according to the iPad’s storage capacity: 1 for 16GB of storage, 2 for 32GB,
3 for 64GB, and 4 for 128GB.
Price and Shipping Fees. Contrary to the auction format, with fixed price listings
sellers set prices for their products, and consumers choose whether to purchase a given
product at the stated price. Using the fixed-price listings allows for a larger dataset
but introduces endogeneity issues that arise from using set prices instead of auction
prices. The final price a buyer pays for a product includes the price and the shipping
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fees, both of which are determined by the seller. For each transaction, we extract
the values of these items as our PRICE and SHIPPING variables. Additionally we
created a SHIP dummy variable and set the value to 0 if the seller offered free shipping
and 1 if the seller charged for shipping the product. In our dataset the majority of
the sellers offered free shipping with their listings, while shipping charges ranged from
0 to $41 dollars. For location-dependent shipping charges, estimates were obtained
using a common address.
Return Policy and Warranty Length. In addition to price and shipping fees, sellers
also decide whether to allow the consumer to return the product and, if so, whether
they will refund the return shipping fees and/or charge a restocking fee. Return policy
length ranged from 0 to 60 days, with the majority of listings featuring a 7-day policy.
We set the RETURN POLICY variable to the length of the return policy with a value
of 0 indicating that the seller does not accept returns. Similarly, RESTOCK FEE
measures the value of any restocking fees charged by the seller with a value of 0 if
the seller does not charge a fee. RESHIP indicates whether a seller pays for shipping
fees and equals 0 if return shipping fees are paid by the buyer and 1 if the fees are
paid by the seller. Additionally we created a RETURN dummy variable and set the
value to 0 if the seller did not accept returns. A small percentage (approximately
3%) of products were sold with a seller’s warranty, in addition to a return policy. Our
WARRANTY measure indicates if a seller’s warranty was offered with the product
with 0 indicating that a warranty was not offered with the product. As the length of
the warranty may vary from seller to seller, we also capturedWARRANTY LENGTH,
which measures the length of the warranty (in days) that is offered with the product
with a value of 0 indicating that a warranty was not offered with the product.
Listing Time Details. To build our structural model, we captured the following
temporal details for each listing. First, we captured the date and time at which the
product was sold and extracted the MONTH out of each time stamp for aggregation
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purposes. Second, we captured the number of iPads of the same generation that were
available at the time of purchase. We used the average number of iPad products
for sale over a two-week period as a proxy for the number and types of categories
included in the set of choices presented to a consumer at a given time of purchase.
This information is represented by the TOTAL ACTIVE variable.
Other Controls. In addition to the aforementioned product-related variables, all
text that appeared on the original product listing page, including all product de-
scription content, was captured as a reference to confirm the warranty length. We
controlled for any product accessories that were sold with the iPad and created a
dummy variable for each category of accessory: HEADPHONES, EXTRACHGR,
STYLUS, CASE, EARPHONE, DOCK, HEADSET, KEYBOARD, LIGHTCLIP,
MOUNT. In our analysis, we used sum of accessories as a single control variable
rather than have 10 separate control variables since many of these variables had a
value of 0 in our dataset. We also noted whether the product had 3G or 4G cellular
capabilities and coded our 3G and 4G measures as 1 for products with these features
and 0 for products with no cellular capabilities. Last, as a New condition product’s
packaging may or not be sealed, we created a dummy variable SEALED and set it
to 1 if the iPad was sold in its original, unopened shrink wrap.
2.3.2 Seller Related Variables
Seller Reputation. When eBay members purchase or sell items, they are given the
opportunity to leave feedback – often classified as positive, negative or neutral – about
the transaction. Over time, eBay sellers develop a reputation based on this feedback.
Abbreviated information about each seller is featured on each product–listing page in
addition to a link to the seller’s full feedback profile. From this profile page (Figure
2.6), we extracted several reputation measures noted in the previous literature to
impact consumers’ choices.
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Figure 2.5: Example of Product Listing Page. Extracted Fields are Boxed.
Figure 2.6: Example of Seller Feedback Profile Page. Extracted Fields are
Boxed.
Seller feedback score (provided directly below the seller name in Figure 2.6) is
the ratio of positive to total reviews (i.e. positive, negative, and neutral) a seller
has received. This variable is reported as a percentage and captured in our FEED-
BACKSCORE measure.
A seller’s net feedback score (located next to the seller name in Figure 2.6) rep-
resents the net number of positive, negative, and neutral Feedback ratings an eBay
seller has received over their tenure. Sellers receive one point for each positive rating,
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no points for each neutral rating, and are penalized by one point for each negative
rating. Given that the majority of feedback is positive, the feedback score can be
viewed as a proxy for a seller’s relative sales volume. We set this total to our NET-
FEEDBACK variable. In accordance with Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012),
we further separated this score into a measure of total neutral and negative feedback
counts, represented by NET NEGATIVE, and the number of positive feedback counts
as a measure of NET POSITIVE.
The detailed seller ratings represent the average score (out of five points) a seller
has received in four specific performance categories: item as described, communi-
cation, shipping time, and shipping and handling charges. These ratings are in-
dependent of the seller’s feedback and net feedback score. We thus include ITEM
DESCRIPTION SCORE, SHIPTIME SCORE, COMMUNICATION SCORE, and
SHIPHAND SCORE in our model as variables.
Last, Seller incumbency measures the length of time a seller has been a member
of eBay. Similar to Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012), we measure SELLER
INCUMBENCY as the number of days from the time of the sellers’ initial registration
with eBay to the start time of the product listing. A comparison of the data source
and categorical and continuous variables included in the current and previous studies
is shown in Figure 7.
2.3.3 Aggregation Technique and Descriptive Statistics
To prepare the data for analysis, we first segment the transactions by purchase date.
Specifically, we separate the transactions by month (December 2014 to July 2015),
thus defining multiple marketsİ. Since we use data from eBay, geographic conditions
are less likely to impact sales. Thus, we segment markets by time so that factors
like seasonality can be accurately captured. The total sales figures were extracted
from eBay using the same technique leveraged to capture the primary dataset. We
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Figure 2.7: Comparison on Variables Included in Current and Pre-
vious Studies
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aggregated the data in each market by seller. Thus, for each month, we calculated
the average values for each seller that sells product condition, size and generation (see
Table 2.1). Our 7, 700 individual transactions representing over one million dollars of
iPad products were transformed into 5, 288 observations through this aggregation.
Descriptive statistics for the iPad conditions and generations are given in Tables
2.2, 2.3, and 2.6 and descriptive statistics of relevant continuous and categorical
variables are given in Tables 2.5 and 2.4.
Table 2.1: Example of Aggregation Technique
month sellerID condtn. size 4G 3G gen. ijklm sold avgprice avgfdbk score
5 1010 5 1 0 0 1 1010,5,1,0,1 1 88 4391
5 1025 5 2 0 0 1 1025,5,2,0,1 1 127 66386
5 1160 5 3 0 0 1 1160,5,3,0,1 1 113.95 1088
6 1010 5 2 0 0 1 1010,5,2,0,1 1 95 4391
6 1025 5 2 0 0 1 1025,5,2,0,1 1 127 66386
6 1138 5 1 0 0 1 1138,5,1,0,1 1 109 91
7 1010 5 1 0 0 1 1010,5,1,0,1 1 88 4391
7 1010 5 2 0 0 1 1010,5,2,0,1 1 95 4391
7 1025 5 2 0 0 1 1025,5,2,0,1 1 127 66386
7 113 5 1 0 0 1 113,5,1,0,1 1 84.99 1233
7 1160 5 1 0 0 1 1160,5,1,0,1 1 85.75 1088
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for iPad Conditions
Condition Obsv. Mean Price Std. Dev. Min Max
New 209 $343.97 89.76 134.00 694.87
New Open-Box 217 $269.18 76.21 107.65 692.46
Manufacturer 3P Cert. Refurbished 194 $230.92 70.40 89.99 535.00
Seller Refurbished 541 $204.95 67.87 67.00 399.99
Used 4,127 $180.94 71.56 60.21 499.99
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for iPad Generations
iPad Generation Obsv. Mean Price Std. Dev. Min Max
One (Oldest Model) 1,053 $98.50 23.51 60.21 299.95
Two 1,792 $164.05 32.35 104.94 369.99
Three 1,010 $217.82 38.22 124.00 419.95
Four (Newest Model) 1,433 $289.61 62.81 175.00 694.87
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables
Variable Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Price 5, 288 195.29 80.73 60.21 694.87
Shipping 5, 288 4.18 5.58 0 41.19
Total Active 5, 288 431.34 236.84 17 685
Restock Fee 5, 276 0.01 0.04 0 0.20
Return Policy 5, 277 10.75 11.52 0 60
Warranty Length 5, 288 5.22 48.99 0 1, 810.49
Seller Incumbency 4, 669 3, 075.84 1, 198.70 14 42, 208
Feedback Score 5, 288 0.98 0.11 0 1
Net Feedback Score 5, 288 15, 791.15 58, 788.47 0 638, 792
Ship Hand Score 3, 412 4.95 0.11 2.50 5
Shiptime Score 3, 419 4.96 0.12 2.45 5
Communication Score 3, 252 4.94 0.13 2.45 5
Item Description Score 3, 420 4.88 0.13 2.40 5
Net Negative Score 2, 762 162.26 517.13 1 3, 686
Net Positive Score 4, 614 2, 927.55 11, 360.40 1 176, 132
Sealed 5, 288 0.01 0.11 0 1
Sum of Accessories 5, 274 0.23 0.70 0 5
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables
Variable Categories Count Percentage
Condition
1: New 209 3.95
2: New Open-Box 217 4.10
3: Manufacturer 3P Cert. Refurbished 194 3.67
4: Seller Refurbished 541 10.23
5: Used 4, 127 78.04
Generation
1 1, 053 19.91
2 1, 792 33.89
3 1, 010 19.10
4 1, 433 27.10
Size
1: 16 GB 2, 525 47.75
2: 32 GB 1, 666 31.51
3: 64 GB 1, 018 19.25
4: 128 GB 79 1.49
4G 0: No 4G Available 4, 858 91.871: 4G Available 430 8.13
3G 0: No 3G Available 4, 578 86.571: 3G Available 710 13.43
Return Policy 0: No 2, 313 43.741: Yes 2, 975 56.26
Restock Fee 0: No 4, 956 93.721: Yes 332 6.28
Shipping Fee 0: No 3, 151 59.591: Yes 2, 137 40.41
Warranty 0: No 3, 151 96.121: Yes 175 3.88
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics for iPad Conditions and Generation
Generation 1 2 3 4
Condition Count Percent Avg Price Count Percent Avg Price Count Percent Avg Price Count Percent Avg Price
1 12 1.1% $239.29 52 2.9% $261.49 19 1.9% $325.20 126 8.8% $390.81
2 22 2.1% $149.43 54 3.0% $223.88 46 4.6% $276.30 95 6.6% $319.21
3 10 0.9% $118.85 70 3.9% $179.72 40 4.0% $229.23 74 5.2% $295.42
4 72 6.8% $105.11 187 10.4% $168.60 109 10.8% $215.51 173 12.1% $279.14
5 937 89.0% $94.77 1429 79.7% $156.88 796 78.8% $211.61 965 67.3% $274.92
Total 1053 1792 1010 1433
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2.4 Analysis and Initial Results
Choice modeling is the most natural approach for determining how consumers choose
between different conditions (i.e. New, Remanufactured, and Used) of the same
product (Garrow, 2016). However, a direct application of choice models such as
multinomial or nested logit is difficult as we do not know what other options each
consumer was exposed to when they made their purchase decision. Thus, we leverage
the Berry (1994) estimation method for demand estimation in differentiated markets.
This model allows us to estimate the impact of price and other product and seller
characteristics on demand using aggregate sales data. To develop the model, we first
define the utility of an individual i purchasing j as
Uij = αpj + βx′j + ξj + εij, (2.1)
where x′j is a vector of product and seller characteristics (return policy, product condi-
tion, seller reputation information, and shipping costs) observed by both researchers
and consumers, pj is the average price, ξj is a vector of product characteristics un-
observed by the researchers but observed by consumers, and εij is an error term
representing consumer i’s idiosyncratic preferences for product j. We express the
aggregate utility for product j as
δj = αpj + βx′j + ξj. (2.2)
We use Berry’s (1994) inversion method to derive the following non-nested model
ln(sj)− ln(s0) = δj = αpj + βx′j + ξj, (2.3)
where sj is the market share of product j and s0 is the market share of the outside
option. We compute sj as the total sales of classic iPads observed in our data set and
s0 as the total sales of other iPads – i.e. iPad Mini and iPad Air – not observed in
our dataset (i.e. the outside option).
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The non-nested model described above violates the independence of irrelevance
alternatives (IIA) property. This is problematic because consumers who purchase a
New condition product may be more likely to select another New condition product
than a Used-condition product. A priori, we do not know what the best nesting
structure is. It may be that customers are more likely to purchase within the same
generation, or they may be more likely to purchase within the same condition (e.g.
only buy New). Thus, we build two separate models where we nest our data both by
condition in one model and by generation in the second model. A test comparing the
coefficients of log(sj|g) from both the models (see Tables 2.8 and 2.12) failed to reject
the null hypothesis that both coefficients are different from each other. However, we
present the nested by condition model in the main body of the paper and present the
results obtained from the nested by generation model in the post-hoc section due to
the higher significance levels of cross-price elasticities in the nested by condition case.
We created six nests (g= 0, 1,2,3,4,5) based on the product condition where
g = 1 contains New product offerings, g = 2 contains New Open-Box offerings,
g = 3 contains Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished offerings, g = 4 contains Seller
Refurbished offerings, g = 5 contains Used offerings, and g = 0 contains the outside
option only. Using the Berry inversion method, we derive the nested logit model as
ln(sj)− ln(s0) = αpj + βx′j + σ log (sj|g) + ξj, (2.4)
where σ is a substitutability factor (0 < σ < 1), and sj|g is the market share of seller
j within nest g.
2.4.1 Condition Nested Models
Table 2.7 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the condition nested
model. For our return policy, shipping, and restocking fee variables, recall that we also
created a binary variable with value = 0 if the original variable has value = 0 and 1 if
the original variable has a value greater than 0. We add the interaction between the
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binary variable and the original continuous variable along with the binary variable in
our estimation to account for the difference in behavior of consumers when the seller
does not accept any returns, has free shipping, or has no restocking fee. As can be seen
from Table 2.7, price has a negative (β = −4×10−3) and highly significant (p < .001)
effect on consumers’ choices. The estimate of the coefficient σ of nested market share
is 0.51, which falls in the acceptable range between 0 and 1 indicating that it captures
substitutability (Berry, 1994). Thus, the estimate of σ = 0.51 provides evidence that
a nested model provides superior fit to a non-nested model.
It is likely that the product’s price and nested market share are correlated with
unobserved characteristics. For example, if there are unobserved factors (to the re-
searcher) that may cause the demand for a particular condition or generation to be
higher in a certain period, then a seller may set a higher price that period. To correct
for this possible endogeneity, we use instrumental variables (IVs) for price and nested
market share. The sum of the other observations’ characteristics (i.e., total active,
feedback score, net feedback score, and return policy) within a nest in a market are
used as instruments for each observation’s price and nested market share. Other ob-
servations’ characteristics are appropriate instruments since they are excluded from
the utility equation (uij or δj does not depend on product/seller characteristics of
other observations) and they are correlated with prices via the markups in the first-
order conditions (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995). Similar set of instruments have
been used in past operations management studies that have used aggregate choice
models (e.g. Guajardo et al., 2015). We use the two stage least squares (2SLS) estima-
tion method (Angrist et al., 1995) to get the IV estimates. We tested for endogeneity
using both Durbin and Wu-Hausman scores. The Durbin χ2 statistic was 691.09
(p < .001) and the Wu-Hausman F statistic was 512.28 (p < .001). These results
indicate the presence of endogeneity of price and nested market share.
The results for the condition nested model with instruments are shown in Table
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Table 2.7: Condition Nested Model: OLS Estimates [DV:
ln(sj)− ln(s0)]
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Price −4.00× 10−3∗∗∗ (3.38× 10−4)
log(sj|g) 0.51∗∗∗ (0.01)
Total Active 2.35× 10−3∗∗∗ (8.17× 10−5)
Feedback Score 3.64× 10−3 (1.24)
Net Feedback Score 5.82× 10−7∗∗∗ (1.52× 10−7)
Warranty −0.03 (0.06)
Communication Score 0.34∧ (0.18)
Shiphand Score 0.25 (0.18)
Shiptime Score −0.09 (0.17)
Item Description Score −0.25 (0.19)
Warranty Length −9.84× 10−5 (3.71× 10−4)
Seller Incumbency 7.04× 10−6 (6.05× 10−6)
Net Positive Score −2.30× 10−6∗∗ (8.24× 10−7)




Return ∗ Return Policy 4.80× 10−3∗∗∗ (1.17× 10−3)
Shipping 0.23∗∗∗ (0.05)
Shipping ∗ Shipping Fee −0.01∗∗ (5.23× 10−3)
Restock 0.10 (0.12)
Restock ∗ Restock Fee −0.50 (0.68)
3G 0.05 (0.03)
4G 0.05 (0.04)
iPad Size 32 GBa −0.04 (0.02)
iPad Size 64 GBa 0.11∗∗∗ (0.03)
iPad Size 128 GBa 0.61∗∗∗ (0.10)
iPad Generation 2b 0.18∗∗∗ (0.04)
iPad Generation 3b 0.98∗∗∗ (0.05)
iPad Generation 4b 0.67∗∗∗ (0.07)
Intercept −7.94∗∗∗ (1.22)
a: Holdout Group: IPad Size 16 GB, b: Holdout Group: IPad Generation 1,
∗∗∗p < .001, ∗∗p < .01, ∗p < .05, ∧p < .1
2.8. The coefficient of price is negative (β = −0.03) and statistically significant
(p < .001). As expected, the coefficient of price is more negative in the model with
instruments than without instruments. This provides further support that price was
endogenous with the nested market shares. The estimate of σ = 0.41 remains in the
acceptable range to support nesting (Berry, 1994). The coefficient of net feedback
score is positive and significant (β = 1.24 × 10−6, p < .001), while the coefficient
of net negative score is negative and significant (β = −1.78 × 10−4, p < .01). The
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Table 2.8: Condition Nested Model: IV Estimates [DV:
ln(sj)− ln(s0)]
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Price −0.03∗∗∗ (5.95× 10−3)
log(sj|g) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.07)
Total Active −5.00× 10−5 (2.72× 10−4)
Feedback Score 2.93 (2.63)
Net Feedback Score 1.24× 10−6∗∗∗ (3.37× 10−7)
Warranty 0.11 (0.12)
Communication Score −0.87∧ (0.47)
Shiphand Score −0.65 (0.40)
Shiptime Score 0.27 (0.37)
Item Description Score 0.63 (0.44)
Warranty Length −3.08× 10−4 (7.71× 10−4)
Seller Incumbency 1.15× 10−5 (1.26× 10−5)
Net Positive Score −1.57× 10−6 (1.71× 10−6)




Return ∗ Return Policy 4.63× 10−3∧ (2.46× 10−3)
Shipping −0.02 (0.16)
Shipping ∗ Shipping Fee 0.01 (0.01)
Restock −0.23 (0.26)
Restock ∗ Restock Fee 0.84 (1.46)
3G −0.10 (0.07)
4G 0.52∗∗∗ (0.14)
iPad Size 32 GBa 0.46∗∗∗ (0.11)
iPad Size 64 GBa 1.07∗∗∗ (0.23)
iPad Size 128 GBa 4.57∗∗∗ (0.94)
iPad Generation 2b 2.14∗∗∗ (0.42)
iPad Generation 3b 3.55∗∗∗ (0.66)
iPad Generation 4b 4.47∗∗∗ (0.89)
Intercept −3.57 (2.73)
a: Holdout Group: IPad Size 16 GB, b: Holdout Group: IPad Generation 1,
∗∗∗p < .001, ∗∗p < .01, ∗p < .05, ∧p < .1
coefficient of sealed is positive (β = 2.80) and highly significant (p < .001). Finally,
the coefficients of sizes and generations are positive and significant, i.e. all else equal
(including price), demand for larger memory and a newer generation is higher. We
conducted further tests for the validity of our instruments. In the first stage of
2SLS, the tests for excluded instruments for both price and nested market share
reject the null hypothesis of excluded instruments having no explanatory power. The
F -statistic (p-value) for price, and nested market share are 22.74 (p < .001), and
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334.09 (p < .001), respectively. These results support the strength of our instruments
(Staiger and Stock, 1994). Next, we ran the test of underidentification of instruments
and the null hypothesis that our instruments are underidentified is rejected (the
Anderson Canonical Correlation LM Statistic is 28.45 (p < .001)). These tests provide
further validity to our model specification and the use of instruments to address the
endogeneity of price, and the nested market share variables (Guajardo et al., 2015).
2.5 Discussion of Main Results
Using the estimates in Table 2.8 and Equation 2.5, we compute the product’s own
and cross-price elasticities using conditions as nests, where i, j ∈ 1, 2, ...5288. For
the own-price elasticities shown in Table 2.9, we estimate whether the own-price
elasticities of product conditions g (g = 2, 3, 4, 5) are different than the own price
elasticity of product condition 1 at the 95% significance level. We use the upper and
lower confidence interval estimates of α and σ to estimate our significance level by
checking to see if the elasticity estimates (calculated using either the upper or lower
values from the 95% confidence intervals) have any overlaps. We estimate whether
the cross-price elasticities of product pair (i, j) [i 6= j, (i, j) 6= (2, 1)] are different from
the cross price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at the 95% significance level using
























if i 6= j, i ∈ g, j /∈ g
−αpjsj if i 6= j, i, j ∈ g.
(2.5)
2.5.1 Own and Cross-Price Elasticity Calculations by Condition
In Table 2.9, the own and cross-price elasticities are averaged and reported at the
condition level where we control for generation. The diagonal represents average own-
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price elasticities for each of the five conditions, and the off-diagonal represents average
cross-price elasticity values for each condition pairing. The cross-price elasticity values
show how price changes in the conditions listed in the columns affect market share
for the conditions listed in the table rows. For example, a 1% increase in the New
condition price (first column), increases market share for New Open-Box by 0.18%,
Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished by 0.17%, Seller Refurbished by 0.18%, and
Used by 0.18%. The own price elasticity values shows the resulting percent decrease
in market share when the price of a single iPad increases by 1%. For example, a
percent increase in the price of a single seller’s Seller Refurbished condition iPad,
decreases market share for that seller by 10.59% on average.
From the own-price elasticity results, we find that the New product condition
category is the most sensitive to changes in its own price, followed by the New Open-
Box-box category, Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished, Seller Refurbished and
Used category. Further, we note significant differences in the own-price elasticity
values across conditions. For example, a 1% increase in New-condition products’ price
decreases market share for New products by approximately 17.60%. In contrast, a 1%
increase in the price of Used-condition products’ price decreases market share for Used
products by only 9.4%. A possible explanation for this result is that consumers are
more sensitive to changes in prices for product conditions that are more standardized
in nature i.e., the quality of a New condition product will not vary much across sellers
whereas the quality of a Refurbished or Used condition product is more prone to vary.
This finding is consistent with the previous literature - both Abbey et al. (2015) and
Ovchinnikov (2011) discuss how consumers are often uncertain about the quality of
Refurbished products.
Also from the own-price elasticity calculations, we find that for remanufactured
products, the effect of changes in price differs slightly according to the seller’s clas-
sification: a 1% increase in the price decreases market share for Manufacturer 3P
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Certified Refurbished products by approximately 11.78% while a 1% increase in the
price decreases demand for Seller Refurbished (non-certified) products by 10.59%.
Although Subramanian and Subramanyam (2012) find that consumers are willing
to pay slightly more on average for OEM-certified Refurbished products, our results
suggest that consumers are also more sensitive to increases in OEM-certified prices
(versus increases in non-certified Refurbished products’ prices). This additional sen-
sitivity to OEM-certified product prices could offset the benefits of higher prices if
sellers of these products are not aware of the highlighted market effects.
From the cross-price elasticity values, we find that gains in market share of the
other four conditions are higher when the price of New products increases as compared
to similar increases in the price of Used products. Further, we are able to directly
examine the threat of cannibalization from Refurbished products. Our results allow
us to test the effects of (1) changes in New products’ prices on Refurbished prod-
ucts’ market share and (2) changes in Refurbished products’ prices on New products’
market share.
We find evidence that changes in New products’ prices do impact the market share
of Refurbished condition goods; however, our results suggest that the overall threat
is moderate and is influenced by the sellers’ classification: a 1% increase in the price
of New-condition goods increases the market share of Refurbished condition products
by only 0.17% to 0.18%. Further, we find that the degree to which Refurbished-
condition products cannibalize New products’ sales is no more than the amount of
cannibalization posed by any of the other product conditions (i.e. New Open-Box
and Used). Thus, Refurbished products do not appear to present a cannibalization
threat to New product sales any more than do Open-Box or Used products.
Our results also suggest that changes in remanufactured products’ price affect the
market share of New and New Open-Box conditions differently: a 1% increase in the
price of Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished products’ price increases the market
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share of New and New Open-Box conditions by only 0.13%, while a 1% increase in
the price of Seller Refurbished products’ price increases the market share of New and
New Open-Box conditions by 0.05% and 0.04% respectively. With regards to the
two categories of remanufactured products, we find that Manufacturer 3P Certified
Refurbished products are much closer substitutes to New-condition products than
Seller Refurbished products (as shown in Figure 2.8). A 1% increase in the price of
Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished products increases the market share of New-
conditions products by 0.13% whereas a 1% increase in the price of Seller Refurbished
products increases the market share of New-condition products by only 0.05%. This
result supports and extends the findings of the Agrawal et al. (2015) study, which
notes that the presence of Seller Refurbished products increases the perceived value
of New products. We find in addition that Seller Refurbished products appear to be
perceived as poor substitutes for New condition products and thus pose little threat
of cannibalization to New condition goods.
Last, from the cross-price elasticity calculations, we find evidence that competition
between the two categories of remanufactured products does exist, but the effects
are asymmetric. Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished products are much more
vulnerable to this competition than Seller Refurbished products. A 1% increase in
the price of Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished products increases demand for
seller refurbished products by 0.12%, whereas a 1% increase in Seller Refurbished
products increases demand for Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished products by
on 0.04%.
2.5.2 Elasticities of Other Variables: Nested on Condition
Table 2.10 gives the elasticities of other significant variables for the overall sample as
well as the average values for each condition. The elasticity values show how changes
in the listed seller characteristics affect market share. These results add to the debate
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Table 2.9: Own and Cross-Price Elasticities by Condition
Condition New New Open-Box Mfr. 3P Cert. Refurbished Seller Refurbished Used
New −17.60 0.15 0.13‡ 0.05‡ 6.3× 10−3‡
New Open-Box 0.18 −13.77 0.13‡ 0.04‡ 5.6× 10−3‡
Mfr. 3P Cert. Refurbished 0.17 0.13‡ −11.78† 0.04‡ 5.1× 10−3‡
Seller Refurbished 0.18 0.13 0.12‡ −10.59† 5× 10−3‡
Used 0.18 0.13‡ 0.11‡ 0.04‡ −9.40†
† denotes own price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5) is different from own price elasticity of product type
1 at 95% significance level. ‡ denotes cross price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i 6= j, (i, j) 6= (2, 1)] is different
from cross price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level.
Figure 2.8: Change in Market Share (ms) of New Products
from Price Increases of Refurbished Products
of whether price or other attributes dominate consumer choices (Ovchinnikov, 2011;
Abbey et al., 2015). Our results indicate that price is by far the principal factor
and, from a managerial perspective, the most important factor. For example, a 1%
increase in the net feedback score and net negative score measure impact market
share on average across all conditions by only 0.036% and 0.084% respectively, while
a 1% increase price impacts market share on average by 12.61% (average of all own-
price elasticities). Regarding seller attributes, we find that the two categories of
Refurbished products are the most elastic to changes in net feedback scores followed
by, New Open-Box, Used, and finally, New products. Although the two categories of
Refurbished products react identically to changes in net feedback score, we find that
there are significant differences to their changes in net negative scores. While the net
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Table 2.10: Elasticities of Other Variables: Nested on Condition
Condition Net Feedback Score Elasticity Net Negative Score Elasticity
New 0.02 −0.05
New Open-Box 0.03 −0.04
Manufacturer 3P Cert. Refurbished 0.05 −0.19
Seller Refurbished 0.05 −0.11
Used 0.03 −0.03
Overall 0.036 −0.084
negative seller feedback score highly influences demand for Manufacturer 3P Certified
Refurbished products, its influence on demand is for Seller Refurbished products is
almost 50% less: a 1% increase in a sellers’ net feedback score decreases market share
by 0.19% for Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished products a 1% increase in a
sellers’ net feedback score decreases market share by 0.11% for Seller Refurbished
products.
2.6 Post-Hoc and Robustness Tests
In this section, we consider a number of extensions and post-hoc and robustness tests
to the previous analyses. To further explore the differences in elasticities between
products of different generations, we estimate the interaction effects between genera-
tion and different variables. Table 2.11 gives the estimates of a model with interaction
effects between generation and seller incumbency (Model 3), and generation and net
feedback score (Model 4). As can be seen, the effect of seller incumbency on market
share is greater for second-generation (β = 5.81× 10−5, p < .1) and third-generation
(β = 9.18× 10−5, p < .05) products as compared to first-generation products. Simi-
larly, the effect of net feedback score on market share is marginally higher for fourth-
generation products (1.81× 10−6, p < .1) as compared to first-generation products.
36
Table 2.11: Condition Nested Model: IV Estimates with Interaction
Effects with Generation [DV: ln(sj)− ln(s0)]
Variable Model 3 Model 4
Price −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
log(sj|g) 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
Total Active −3.91× 10−5 −5.06× 10−5
Feedback Score 2.95 2.75
Net Feedback Score 1.24× 10−6∗∗∗ 3.32× 10−7
Warranty 0.08 0.12
Communication Score −0.86∧ −0.83∧
Shiphand Score −0.60 −0.68∧
Shiptime Score 0.23 0.30
Item Description Score 0.62 0.58
Warranty Length −2.33× 10−4 −2.80× 10−4
Seller Incumbency −3.04× 10−5 (1.34× 10−5)
Net Positive Score −1.82× 10−6 −3.13× 10−6∧




Return ∗ Return Policy 4.74× 10−3∧ 4.68× 10−3∧
Shipping −0.02 −0.04
Shipping ∗ Shipping Fee 0.01 0.01
Restock −0.24 −0.22
Restock ∗ Restock Fee 0.88 0.78
3G −0.10 −0.09
4G 0.52∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
Seller Incumbency ∗ Generation 2 5.81× 10−5∧ -
Seller Incumbency ∗ Generation 3 9.18× 10−5∗ -
Seller Incumbency ∗ Generation 4 1.32× 10−5 -
Net Feedback Score ∗ Generation 2 - 2.99× 10−7
Net Feedback Score ∗ Generation 3 - 1.32× 10−6
Net Feedback Score ∗ Generation 4 - 1.81× 10−6∧
Intercept −3.50 −3.34
a: Holdout Group: Interaction with Generation 1–New. ∗∗∗p < .001, ∗∗p <
.01, ∗p < .05, ∧p < .1. Size, and Generation control estimates not shown for
brevity.
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Table 2.12: Generation Nested Model: IV Estimates with Interaction Effects [DV:
ln(sj)− ln(s0)]
Variable Base Model Model 1 Model 2
Price −1.27× 10−3∗ −1.11× 10−3∗ −8.96× 10−4∧
log(sj|g) 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
Total Active 3.62× 10−4∗ 4.03× 10−4∗ 4.92× 10−4∗∗
Feedback Score 0.09 0.18 0.56
Net Feedback Score 4.61× 10−7∗∗ 4.56× 10−7∗∗ −1.80× 10−6∧
Warranty 0.05 0.04 0.06
Communication Score 0.59∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.55∗∗
Shiphand Score 0.09 0.09 0.14
Shiptime Score −0.29∧ −0.27 −0.34∗
Item Description Score −0.37∗ −0.35∧ −0.32∧
Warranty Length −1.55× 10−4 −1.51× 10−4 −1.88× 10−4
Seller Incumbency 1.16× 10−5∗ −4.18× 10−5∧ 1.11× 10−5∧
Net Positive Score −2.14× 10−6∗∗ −2.18× 10−6∗∗ −8.23× 10−7
Net Negative Score 3.65× 10−5 3.96× 10−5 6.99× 10−5∗∗
Sealed 0.10 0.07 0.05
Accessories −0.09∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
Return 0.05 0.05 0.04
Return ∗ Return Policy 5.60× 10−3∗∗∗ 5.52× 10−3∗∗∗ 5.72× 10−3∗∗∗
Shipping 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
Shipping ∗ Shipping Fee −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
Restock 0.16 0.16 0.15
Restock ∗ Restock Fee −0.89 −0.89 −0.86
3G 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
4G −0.11∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.14∗∗
Seller Incumbency ∗ Condition 2 - 4.09× 10−5 -
Seller Incumbency ∗ Condition 3 - 5.45× 10−5 -
Seller Incumbency ∗ Condition 4 - 6.66× 10−5∗ -
Seller Incumbency ∗ Condition 5 - 5.51× 10−5∗ -
Net Feedback Score ∗ Condition 2 - - 3.13× 10−7
Net Feedback Score ∗ Condition 3 - - 2.01× 10−6
Net Feedback Score ∗ Condition 4 - - 9.96× 10−7
Net Feedback Score ∗ Condition 5 - - 2.30× 10−6∗
Intercept −7.22∗∗∗ −7.20∗∗∗ −7.75∗∗∗
a: Holdout Group: Interaction with Condition 1–New. ∗∗∗p < .001, ∗∗p < .01, ∗p < .05, ∧p < .1. Size, and
Condition control estimates not shown for brevity.
2.6.1 Generation Nested Model
As an alternate model, we nested our observations based on the product’s generation
instead of its condition, i.e., we assume that consumers are more likely to substitute
across generations than across conditions. Thus, a consumer who is considering a
fourth-generation iPad is more likely to consider another fourth-generation iPad (in
a different condition) than a third-generation iPad. This nested model also allows us
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to test for any interaction effects of different variables with condition. In this case, we
estimate Equation 2.4 by nesting our observations based on generation. Columns 2,
3, and 4 of Table 2.12 give the estimates of the base model (without any interaction
effects), the model with interaction effects between condition and seller incumbency
(Model 1), and between condition and net feedback score (Model 2) respectively. As
can be seen, the effect of seller incumbency on the market share is significantly higher
for Seller Refurbished (β = 6.66×10−5, p < .05), and Used products (β = 5.51×10−5,
p < .05) as compared to New products. Similarly, the effect of the net feedback score
on market share is significantly higher for Used products (β = 2.30× 10−6, p < .05)
as compared to New products.
2.6.2 Own and Cross-Price Elasticity Calculations by Generation
Using the estimates in Table 2.13 and Equation 2.5, we compute the product’s own
and cross-price elasticities using generations as nests, where i, j ∈ 1, 2, ...5288. For
the own-price elasticities shown in Table 2.13, we estimate whether the own-price
elasticities of product generations g (g = 2, 3, 4) are different than the own price
elasticity of product generation 1 at the 95% significance level. Similar to the process
employed in section 5 we use the upper and lower confidence interval estimates of α
and σ to estimate our significance level by checking to see if the elasticity estimates
(calculated using either the upper or lower values from the 95% confidence intervals)
have any overlaps. We estimate whether the cross-price elasticities of product pair
(i, j) [i 6= j, (i, j) 6= (2, 1)] are different from the cross price elasticity of product type
pair (2, 1) at the 95% significance level using the upper and lower confidence interval
estimates of α and σ. In Table 2.13 we give the cross-price elasticities averaged and
reported at the generation level where we control for product condition. The diagonal
represents the average own-price elasticities for each of the four generations. From the
own-price calculations, we find that the most recent model of iPads (i.e. generation
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Table 2.13: Own and Cross-Price Elasticities by Generation
Generation One Two Three Four
One (Oldest Model) −0.18 2.26× 10−4 5.10× 10−4 7.20× 10−4
Two 2.17× 10−4 −0.31 5.10× 10−4 7.20× 10−4
Three 2.18× 10−4 2.27× 10−4 −0.41 7.26× 10−4
Four (Newest Model) 2.42× 10−4 2.91× 10−4 5.85× 10−4 −0.54
4) are more sensitive to changes in price: a 1% increase in price for generation 4,
decreases market share by 0.54%, whereas a 1% increase in price for generation 1 (the
oldest iPad version) decreases market share by only 0.18%. Further, from the cross
price elasticity calculations, we discover that when customers switch from generation
4 (because of a price increase) then they do so in order of generation (first 3rd,
then 2nd then 1st). When there is a price increase in any of the other generations
(1 - 3) however, the customers’ choice is always to go to generation 4 first. Thus,
a price increase in generation 1 causes customers to first switch to generation 4,
then 3, then 2. Our results indicate that just as the price of New condition goods
has a disproportionate influence on the demand for the other conditions, so does
the price for the latest generation. We note however that none of our elasticity
measures at the generation level are significant at the 95% level. This finding indicates
that the potential of cannibalization across conditions is greater than the threat of
cannibalization across generations.
2.6.3 Elasticities of Other Variables: Nested on Generation
Table 2.14 gives the elasticities of other significant variables for the overall sample
as well as the average values for each generation. The elasticity values show how
changes in the listed seller characteristics affect market share. Similar to the nested
on condition results presented in section 5, our results indicate that price is by far
the principal factor: a 1% increase in the net feedback score and seller incumbency
score measure impact market share on average across all generations by 0.01% and
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0.05% respectively, a 1% increase price impacts market share on average by 0.36%
(average of all own-price elasticities from Table 2.13). Regarding seller attributes, we
find that newer generation products are more sensitive to changes in seller attributes.
For example, the impact of sellers’ net feedback score on market share is nearly twice
as large for fourth generation products compared to first generation products: a 1%
increase in a sellers’ net feedback score decreases market share by 0.01% for fourth
generations products whereas a 1% increase in a sellers’ net feedback score decreases
market share by 0.005% for first generation products.
Table 2.14: Elasticities of Other Variables: Nested on Generation
Generation Net Feedback Score Elasticity Seller Incumbency Elasticity
1 5.52× 10−3 0.05




2.6.4 Data Availability Robustness Check
Chintagunta and Dube (2005) and Bruno and Vilcassim (2008) point out that the
Berry (1994) model, and its extensions yield biased estimates when some of the
product types have zero sales during some of the time periods. As a robustness
check, we used data from only those months in which all product types were sold.
We have three months of such data. Table A.1 gives the estimates of the main nested
model. As can be seen, the estimates are qualitatively similar to our estimates from
the full dataset shown in Table 2.8. These results support the validity of our findings.
In addition to the above general observations, additional insights can be gleaned
from a comparative look at Figures 2.9 and 2.10, which will be done in the next
section to outline our managerial insights.
41
2.7 Conclusion
The refurbished product industry has experienced rapid growth, yet still remains a
small fraction of the total market for new product sales. One of the main reasons
it has not grown larger is that few OEMs understand how the sales of remanu-
factured products impact the sales of new products, thus causing them to try to
avoid any competition from secondary markets (USITC, 2012a). Although a recent
stream of empirical studies has explored how price and other key factors influence
consumers’ attitudes towards refurbished goods relative to new goods, most only
compare consumers’ purchasing behavior towards new and refurbished versions of
the same products. However, the advent of consumer-to-consumer marketplaces such
as eBay along with advances in product durability levels have facilitated the creation
of used-product markets that feature a dramatically wider selection of product condi-
tions and generations that consumers can choose from (Ghose, 2014). In response, we
study how consumers evaluate refurbished products offered within a product portfolio
of different generations and of different conditions of the same product, including
Used, Open-Box and OEM Certified Refurbished. Among our main findings, as sum-
marized in Figures 2.9 and 2.10, are that product generation, condition, and seller
attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions, and
that the relationship between new and refurbished products is much more nuanced
and context-specific than previously thought.
Through leveraging secondary transaction data on the sales of different genera-
tions and different conditions of Apple iPads on eBay, we calculate cross-price elas-
ticity values for each product generation and condition pairing and provide empirical
clarity to the cannibalization debate. Figure 2.11 summarizes the cross-price elas-
ticity results between New and Refurbished condition products. We find that, when
the consumers’ choice set is explicitly considered, Refurbished products pose little
threat to New products and to other product conditions. Specifically, the cross-price
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Figure 2.9: Summary of Condition Findings
Figure 2.10: Summary of Generation Findings
elasticity of New product condition demand with respect to Manufacturer 3P Cer-
tified Refurbished-condition prices is 0.13% (line A). Our results also indicate that
Refurbished products pose a nearly equivalent threat to other product conditions as
they do to New items. Managers of New products may be tempted to perceive Manu-
facturer 3P Certified and Seller Refurbished products as equivalent threats; however,
our research suggests that Manufacturer 3P Certified products are much closer sub-
stitutes. Our cross-price elasticity calculations suggest that changes in Manufacturer
3P Certified products prices threaten the market share of New and New Open-Box
approximately three times more than changes in Seller Refurbished products prices
(lines A and B). However, we also find that the threat posed by Manufacturer 3P
Certified Refurbished products to New goods is no different than the threat that New
Open-Box products pose to New condition products (lines A and C). Last, we find ev-
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Figure 2.11: Summary of Cross-price Elasticities Between New and Refurbished Con-
ditions
idence that changes in New products’ prices impact the market share of Refurbished
and other condition goods almost equivalently (lines D1, D2, and D3ß).
We find that evidence that competition between the two categories of remanufac-
tured products does exist and that Manufacturer 3P Certified Refurbished products
are three times more vulnerable to this competition than Seller Refurbished prod-
ucts. In addition, from our own-price elasticity results, we find that Manufacturer
3P Certified Refurbished products are more susceptible to within-category compe-
tition than Seller Refurbished products. However, overall, our results suggest that
competition between the two refurbished categories and between new and refurbished
conditions is modest, and thus should not strongly discourage firms from entering the
remanufacturing industry.
Next, we find that the threat of cannibalization across conditions is much stronger
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than the threat of cannibalization between generations of products. Further, our own
and cross-price elasticity calculations allow us to specifically determine those products
for which sellers should be most attentive to changes in price (see Figures 2.9 and
2.10). For example, a seller of Used-condition products may be inclined to primarily
monitor the prices of Seller Refurbished products; however, our results indicate that
New condition product prices have the largest influence on, and thus are the biggest
threat to, demand for Used-condition products.
Across all product generations and conditions, we find that the product’s price
and the seller’s reputation measures (such as net feedback score) are significant pre-
dictors of consumer purchasing behavior. Product price is by far the dominant factor
in shaping consumers’ choices, but we find that the effect is not homogeneous across
product conditions. We also find evidence that previously unstudied factors such as
return policy length and the communication seller rating impact consumers’ choices.
Consistent with the previous literature, these results in sum support the need for
all sellers in secondary markets to (1) build and communicate their reputations (2)
understand the effects of changes of pricing on demand, and (3) strategically lever-
age return policies to stimulate sales (Ovchinnikov, 2011; Subramanian and Subra-
manyam, 2012; Abbey et al., 2015). In addition to these results, by including multiple
generations and conditions of products in our study, we are able to provide further
managerial insights specific to the studied products’ categorization.
Our results suggest that sellers of newer-generation products should be conscious
of their net feedback score measure, as consumers of more recent products focus on
this attribute. Sellers of older generation products, however, should seek to build trust
through highlighting their tenure as a seller. Our results also indicate that sellers of
Refurbished products should be aware of differences in consumers’ perceptions of
remanufactured products, according to their sellers’ classification. For example, our
findings indicate that while changes in net feedback score influence market share for
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Manufacturer 3P Certified and Seller Refurbished equally, the effect of changes in the
net negative measure on market share are nearly two times larger for Manufacturer
3P Certified products than Seller Refurbished goods.
Both research and practice can benefit from related future research, and the fol-
lowing limitations from our study provide promising trajectories for further analyses.
First, our study involved only one product (the Apple iPad) and product type (Elec-
tronics). Future research may consider replicating our analysis across other product
categories and brands of interest, which may vary according to brand equity strength,
product life cycle stage, and product durability levels. Second, we studied consumers’
purchasing behavior on only one platform (eBay). As prior research suggests con-
sumers’ purchasing behavior may be influenced by shopping channel, it would be in-
teresting to study how consumers’ acceptance of remanufactured products vary across
different secondary market platforms (i.e. retail managed sites such as Amazon, OEM
managed sites such as HP or Dell, and third party logistic managed platforms such
as Optoro or Newegg).
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Chapter 3
Promoting E-Recycling: Effects of Electronic
Waste Legislation and Consumer Attributes on
Recycling Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
Rapid increases in the consumption and subsequent waste generation from electronic
products (termed “e-waste”) are growing international concerns (Atasu and Subra-
manian, 2012). In 2014 an estimated 92 billion pounds of e-waste was generated
globally and, of this amount, only 15% was reported as recycled (Baldé et al., 2015).
The surge in e-waste generation presents an environmental risk as many electronic
products contain toxic materials that can leach out of landfills into groundwater or
emit dioxins when burned. E-waste is also subject to be dumped in places where
the products are dismantled under crude and hazardous conditions (such as west-
ern Africa, China and other Asian nations), presenting a threat to people and the
environment (ETBC, 2016).
To protect against these risks, several states in the US have adopted various leg-
islative mechanisms to promote electronic reuse and recycling (see Figure 3.11 for a
summary). One such mechanism is extended producer responsibility (EPR) legisla-
tion, which in addition to fostering e-waste recycling, seeks to (1) shift the costs of
product recycling to manufacturers and (2) create incentives for manufacturers to de-
1Source: www.Deltainstute.org
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sign products with fewer adverse impacts on the environment (Atasu andWassenhove,
2012; Nash and Bosso, 2013). In the U.S., 25 states have adopted EPR legislation
to address the e-waste problem, while the remaining 25 states favor voluntary ef-
forts initiated by nonprofits, local governments and/or manufacturers. A second and
complementary approach to addressing the risks of e-waste is landfill bans, which
prohibit the disposal of electronic products in the trash. In the U.S, 20 states have
adopted landfill bans; however, similar to EPR legislation, the scope of the products
covered by this legislation vary widely by states. A third and final legislative option
is advanced recycling fees. With this option, consumers pay a fee at the point of
purchase on covered electronic products. These fees subsequently “go into a recycling
fund administered by the State, reimbursing recyclers and collectors” (ETBC, 2016).
Currently, California is the only state that leverages this model. In this study, we
focus on the two most widely implemented e-waste legislative measures – landfill bans
and EPR.
Although the motivations for these legislative measures are clear, there is much
debate on the effectiveness of such policies in promoting consumer recycling - a key
objective of e-waste regulation (Wharton, 2016; Nash and Bosso, 2013). A few papers
have studied the effects of the presence of landfill bans in the U.S. on e-waste recycling.
However, the conclusions on the impact of such legislation have been mixed: some
studies have found that the presence of landfill bans does not explain past e-recycling
behavior (Saphores et al., 2012), while others have concluded that landfill bans do
influence consumers’ disposal decisions. (Milovantseva and Saphores, 2013).
A lack of empirical data has limited firms’ and legislators’ ability to assess how
e-waste recycling behavior is influenced by the presence of EPR programs. Indeed, we
are unaware of any academic study that examines how the presence of EPR legislation
affects e-waste consumer recycling behavior. Unlike legislation in other parts of the
world, in the US consistent recycling performance measures are not tracked between
48
Figure 3.1: Summary of E-Waste Laws in the US
states with and without EPR programs (ETBC, 2016). For states with EPR legis-
lation, per-capita collection rates are generally used to track performance. However,
this standard metric has several flaws. First, the specific dimensions of EPR pro-
grams vary widely across states, making it difficult to compare performance. These
dimensions include who pays for the recycling (producer or consumer), the collection
method (municipalities, retailers, producers, etc.), performance goals and incentives
(collection and/or pounds target), and the products included in scope of the legisla-
tion (televisions, tablets, cellphones, etc) (Atasu et al., 2013). Second, changes in the
weight of the electronic products, which tend to become lighter over time, are not
taken into account.
Some stakeholders argue that the legislation lays too heavy a responsibility for
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collection and recycling on manufacturers when consumer behavior is key to pro-
gram success (Nash and Bosso, 2013). The Product Management Alliance (PMA),
a coalition of firms from the carpet, electronics, packaging, and other sectors, note
that, “EPR legislation adds costly and unnecessary mandates for consumers and lo-
cal governments. Further, it damages vital American industries that produce and
manufacture goods, which in turn leads to these industries moving overseas and the
loss of American jobs” (PMA, 2016). As an alternative to EPR legislation, PMA
and similar organizations focus on educating consumers on where and how to recycle
their electronics.
Given these competing perspectives on the importance of consumer attributes
versus legislative actions, the purpose of this study is to examine how recycling and
reuse behaviors are shaped by both consumer characteristics (attitudes and aware-
ness) and the presence of e-waste legislation. Specifically, we address the following
research question: How are consumers’ e-waste disposal choices influenced by their (i)
awareness of landfill bans, (ii) attitudes towards recycling, (iii) awareness of recycling
locations, and the (iv) presence of EPR legislation?
Our research leverages survey data provided by the Electronics Recycling Coor-
dination and Clearinghouse (ERCC), an organization that collects detailed informa-
tion on consumers’ recycling behaviors, attitudes towards recovering electronics, and
awareness of EPR programs. As part of the questionnaire, respondents specified how
they dispose of their electronics once the products have reached their end-of-use. We
group consumers’ responses into three categories — trash, store, and recycle — and
develop a multinomial logistic model to study our research questions.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find, as expected, that in
states with EPR legislation, consumers are more likely to recycle their electronic
waste. Perhaps less intuitively, we find that consumers’ knowledge of landfill bans
increases their likelihood to store their electronics rather than recycle them. Finally,
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we confirm that the biggest deterrents to consumer recycling are not knowing where to
recycle electronic products and inconvenient recycling locations. Through these and
other observations, we provide insights on how administrators of recycling programs
can best leverage e-waste legislation and structure consumer education efforts to
maximize consumer recycling participation.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we review
the relevant literature. In sections 4.4 and 4, we describe our data and methodology,
respectively. In section 5, we present our results and discuss the implications of these
results for practice. We conclude in section 6 with a discussion of limitations of the
study and directions for future research.
3.2 Literature Review
Factors that affect consumers’ likelihood to participate in pro-environmental behav-
iors (such as e-waste recycling) have been studied extensively within the economic
(Viscusi et al., 2011), environmental psychology (Bagozzi and Dabholkar, 1994), and
consumer behavior literatures (Iyer and Kashyap, 2007). Specifically, studies have in-
vestigated and debated that consumers’ pro-environmental behaviors are influenced
by factors such as social norms, religious and cultural beliefs, habits, demograph-
ics, degree of environmental knowledge/concern, incentives, and legislative policy
(Sabbaghi et al. (2015), see Iyer and Kashyap (2007) for a review). This literature,
however, has often disputed the generalizability of consumers’ recycling behaviors to
other materials or environmentally responsible behaviors (Domina and Koch, 2002).
Thus, the relatively new challenges posed by e-waste have initiated a new stream of
empirical research that focuses specifically on factors that influence e-waste recycling.
In practice, and as noted by Milovantseva and Saphores (2013), e-waste recycling
can be enhanced by a number of complementary measures, which include (1) edu-
cating consumers about the dangers of dumping e-waste and the social benefits of
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recycling it properly, (2) creating economic incentives to foster recycling, (3) requir-
ing producers to be responsible for the end-of-life of their products (i.e. EPR), and
(4) banning the improper disposal of e-waste.
While the effects of legislative measures (such as disposal bans and EPR for e-
waste) on consumer recycling have not been studied extensively in the e-waste liter-
ature, several studies have explored the effects of consumer attributes on recycling
outcomes. For example, through an extensive survey of US households, Saphores
et al. (2012) analyzed factors associated with (i) consumers’ who had previously re-
cycled and (ii) consumers’ willingness to recycle e-waste using curb-side services. The
authors found that consumers who had previously recycled were older (i.e. over 60
years old), aware of the toxicity of electronics materials, and had strong moral norms
(Saphores et al., 2012). The authors also found that consumers’ willingness to re-
cycle was strongly associated with factors such as recycling convenience, knowledge
of toxicity of e-waste, and prior e-waste experience (Saphores et al., 2012). Last,
sociodemographic factors such as education, gender, and ethnicity were found to be
weakly associated with consumers’ willingness to recycle, but not associated with prior
e-waste drop off behavior (Saphores et al., 2012). In a related study, Milovantseva
and Saphores (2013) examined the characteristics of consumers who store electron-
ics that are no longer in use. The authors found that pro-environmental attitudes,
age, marital status, gender, and geographic location are all significant in explaining
the number of broken or obsolete TVs stored by US households (Milovantseva and
Saphores, 2013).
In addition to these papers, several studies have examined consumers’ e-waste be-
haviors in locations outside of the US. For example, Echegaray and Hansstein (2017)
through a survey of Brazilian citizens, finds that there is a significant gap between
consumers’ intention to recycle and actual recycling behavior, and this gap is partic-
ularly salient among the higher income echelons and Southeast regions of Brazilian
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society. Dwivedy examines recycling preferences for Indian consumers, while Yin
et al. (2014) and Wang et al. (2011) explore consumers’ attitudes toward electronic
recycling in China. The authors find that recycling convenience, recycling habits,
economic benefits, and residential conditions are all associated with consumers’ will-
ingness to participate in recycling (Yin et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2011).
In sum, this body of literature indicates that e-waste recycling can be stimulated
by (i) promoting moral norms, (ii) educating the public about the benefits of recy-
cling e-waste, and (iii) making e-waste recycling more convenient (Saphores et al.,
2012). Factors such as awareness of recycling locations, beliefs about recycling, and
knowledge of the potential environmental hazards caused by e-waste were generally
consistent in explaining consumers’ past recycling behaviors. However, apart from
age and gender, most other demographic variables (such as income, marital status,
family size, etc.) were inconsistently significant across studies.
As mentioned earlier, research examining the effects of legislative measures on
consumer e-waste recycling is in its early stages. A few papers have studied the
effects of landfill bans on e-waste recycling. However, the conclusions on the impact
of such legislation have been mixed. For example, Saphores et al. (2012) find that
consumers’ awareness of e-waste laws does not impact their willingness to recycle
or explain previous recycling behavior. However, Milovantseva and Saphores (2013)
found that the presence of state e-waste bans does promote the recycling of cell phones
but not consumers’ intentions to recycle televisions.
Further, although end consumer participation has been acknowledged as a critical
success factor of EPR programs (Lai et al., 2014), to our knowledge there have been
no academic studies of how/if the presence of EPR legislation affects e-waste con-
sumer recycling behavior. In general, most research on e-waste EPR focuses on how
producers can achieve operational efficiency and minimize compliance costs (Atasu
and Wassenhove, 2012; Esenduran and Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya, 2015), or on understanding
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the effects that e-waste EPR has on firms’ product designs and prices (Plambeck and
Wang, 2009; Favot and Marini, 2013). In addition, a few papers provide anecdotal
information on features of e-waste EPR programs in various geographical locations
(Mayers et al., 2011).
We address this gap in the literature by examining how consumer e-waste recycling
behavior is influenced by two forms of e-waste legislation: EPR and landfill bans.
In addition, we extend previous literature, by assessing how consumers’ awareness
of (versus the mere presence of) landfill bans affects their e-waste disposal choices.
Further, we leverage an expanded choice set, which allows us to uniquely study how
consumer attributes and legislative mechanisms affect consumers’ use of a wide range
of e-waste disposal options.
3.3 Data
The data for our study were provided by the Electronics Recycling Coordination and
Clearinghouse organization (ERCC). Founded in 2010, this non-profit organization
serves as an information forum for state governments that have, or are considering
implementing, electronics recycling laws. It also serves as an information source for
those that are complying with state e-waste legislation. Members of ERCC meet bi-
monthly to coordinate various research initiatives and formalize joint responses on key
implementation issues. Two levels of membership exist: voting members (includes
the environmental agencies of states with EPR legislation) and affiliate members
(includes industry representatives, non-profits, and other key stakeholders). A list of
ERCC legislative and affiliate members is provided in the appendix in Table B.1.
In March of 2014, ERCC members developed a survey to measure consumers’
awareness of e-waste recycling locations and legislation (i.e. landfill bans). The
motivation for the survey stemmed from the need to generate a comparable e-waste
recycling performance measure across states. Prior to this study, it was difficult to
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evaluate EPR program performance using the standard “pounds of e-waste collected
per resident” measure as states differ in the types of products (i.e. laptops, desktops,
cellphones) and entities (i.e. consumers, businesses, nonprofits) that are covered by
their EPR programs. However, in measuring consumer awareness rates — defined by
ERCC as, “the level of awareness of electronics recycling programs among consumers
for whom the services are available” — a comparable and key recycling performance
metric could be obtained.
The survey script and questions were developed independently by ERCC members
and affiliates (please see Figure B.1 in the appendix). In total, ten questions with pre-
specified answers were included in the survey and measured consumers’ (i) disposal
choices, (ii) awareness of recycling location and legislation (iii) interest in recycling
activities and (iv) demographic information. Respondents were also able to provide
comments for each question, which our team reviewed as a part of our analysis. In
the following sections and tables we discuss how we translate the survey data into
categorical variables for our analysis.
3.3.1 Consumers’ E-Waste Disposal Behavior
We define our dependent variable DISPOSAL as consumers’ answer to the survey
question, “What do you typically do with electronics, such as televisions, computers,
monitors and printers that you no longer want?” For our initial analysis, we group
consumers’ responses into three categories and set the DISPOSAL variable to 0 if the
consumer stated that they throw their electronics in the trash, 1 if the consumer stated
that they store their electronics, and 2 if the consumer stated that they recycle or reuse
their electronics. In subsequent analysis, we use the ungrouped DISPOSAL variable
(see Table 3.1) as our dependent variable. As shown in Table 3.1, nearly 80% of
respondents stated that they generally recycle or reuse their electronics. Specifically,
donating electronics to a nonprofit organization was the most popular disposal choice
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(approximately 26% of respondents), followed by recycling at a town or county center
(approximately 21% of respondents), and recycling at a store (approximately 15% of
respondents).
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Variable Description Categories Count Percentage
Disposal (grouped) Consumers’ e-waste 1: Trash 174 8.93
disposal choice 2: Store 252 12.94
3: Recycle or Reuse 1524 78.23
Disposal (ungrouped) Consumers’ e-waste 1: Trash 174 8.93
disposal choice 2: Store 252 12.94
3: Give to Family Member 300 15.4
4: Donate 512 26.28
5: Recycle at Store 296 15.2
6: Recycle at Town/County Center 416 21.36
3.3.2 Consumer Awareness-Related Variables
Three questions were used to gauge consumers’ awareness of e-waste recycling loca-
tions and legislation.
First, each survey participant was asked if they were aware of electronic landfill
bans in their resident state. We model the LEGALAWARENESS variable as 1 if the
consumer responded “yes” and 0 if the consumer responded “no.”
Location Awareness. In addition to awareness of landfill bans, survey participants
were asked if they knew where they could recycle their used, unwanted electronic
products. We model the variable LOCATIONAWARENESS as 0 if the consumer
responded “no,” 1 if the consumer indicated that he/she was somewhat aware of e-
waste recycling locations, and 2 if the consumer indicated that he/she was certain of
recycling locations.
Last, consumers were asked to identify where they go to find information on where
to recycle their used electronics. We model the variable INFOSOURCE according
to the following grouping scheme: 0 if the consumer indicated that he/she does not
gather information on e-waste recycling, 1 if the consumer indicated general sources
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- such as the internet, phone book, etc., 2 for information from manufacturers or
retailers, 3 for non-profits (i.e. greenergadgets.org), and 4 for government sources.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables
Variable Description Categories Count Percentage
Age Age of survey participant 1*: 18-35 676 34.7
2: 36-45 306 15.71
3: 46-55 358 18.38
4: 56-65 372 19.1
5: 66+ 236 12.11
EPR Indicates if EPR legislation is present 0*: No 441 22.64
in consumers’ resident state 1: Yes 1507 77.36
Distance Distance that consumer is willing 1: 1-5 miles 559 28.7
to travel to recycle electronics 2: 6-10 miles 787 40.4
3: 11-20 miles 444 22.79
4*: 21 miles + 158 8.11
Legalawareness Indicates if consumer is aware of 0*: No 1245 63.91
landfill bans in resident state 1: Yes 703 36.09
Locationawareness Indicates if consumer is aware of 0*: No 565 29
recycling locations in resident state 1: Somewhat 601 30.85
2: Yes 782 40.14
Importance Importance of electronic 1*: Not 23 1.18
recycling to consumer 2: Not Very 2 2.67
3: Neutral 168 8.62
4: Somewhat 539 27.67
5: Very 1166 59.86
Infosource Primary source of consumers’ 0*: None 112 5.75
recycling information 1: General 434 22.28
2: Government 736 37.78
3: RetailManu 243 12.47
4: NonProfit 398 20.43
5: Garbage 25 1.28
Prevent Stated reasons for not 0*: None 108 5.54
recycling 1: Too Expensive 350 17.97
2: Inconvenient Location 487 25
3: Unable to Transport Items 434 22.28
4: Unaware of Recycling Locations 569 29.21
Rural Indicates if consumer lives in 0*: No 1246 63.96
area with less than 50,000 residents 1: Yes 702 36.04
*denotes reference category
3.3.3 Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Recycling Activities
The second section of the survey measured consumers’ interest in recycling activities.
Survey participants were asked to identify the top factor that would prevent them
from recycling. We modeled the variable PREVENT as 0 if the consumer indicated
that there were no limiting factors, 1 if the consumer selected “not knowing where
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to recycle”, 2 if the consumer selected “unable to transport items”, 3 if the con-
sumer selected “inconvenient recycling location”, and 4 if the consumer selected “too
expensive.”
We model the variable DISTANCE according to consumers’ response to the ques-
tion “what is the farthest you would be willing to travel to deliver your unwanted
device?”: 0 if the consumer selected “1-5 miles away," 1 if the consumer selected “6-10
miles away,” 2 if the consumer selected “11-20 miles away,” and 3 if the consumer
selected “21 miles away or more.”
Consumers were asked, “In general, how important do you feel it is to recycle
electronic devices that you no longer need or use?” As responses were captured using
a Likert scale, we accordingly modeled the variable IMPORTANCE from 1 if the
consumer selected “very unlikely” to 5 if the consumer selected “very likely.”
3.3.4 EPR Legislation
In addition to the survey-derived variables, we also include a binary indicator variable
EPR in our analysis. We set EPR to 1 if a state had EPR legislation in place in at
the time of the survey and 0 if the state did not. As shown in Table 3.3, we observed
slight differences in the grouped disposal choices of consumers between states with
and without EPR legislation.
Table 3.3: Distribution of Disposal by EPR
Disposal Choice
Legislation Trash Store Recycle
EPR = 0 58 60 323
13.15% 13.61% 73.24%
EPR = 1 116 192 1,199
7.70% 12.74% 79.56%
Average 8.93% 12.94% 78.13%
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3.3.5 Demographic Information
Each survey participant was asked if they live in a rural area (defined by ERCC as a
location with less than 50,000 residents). We model the RURAL variable as 1 if the
consumer responded “yes” and 0 if the consumer responded “no”.
Survey participants were asked to identify their age range. We modeled the vari-
able AGE according to the choices selected by the respondents: 1 if the consumer
selected “18-35 years old”, 2 if the consumer selected “36-45”, 3 if the consumer se-
lected “46-55”, 4 if the consumer selected “56-65”, and 5 if the consumer selected “66
years or older.”
The survey was administered between August of 2014 and March of 2015 by
Service 800 (http://www.service800inc.com), a market research company. Prior to
launching the data collection effort, participating state environmental agencies deter-
mined the number of consumers to be surveyed within a state, according to their de-
sired level of response confidence. Service 800 randomly contacted consumers within
a state until the desired number of complete responses were secured. Twelve states
participated in the survey in total – including six with EPR legislation and five with
landfill bans (see Table 3.4). However, we exclude the results from the state of Hawaii
from our analysis, as a different set of questions was used to survey consumers in this
state. Of the 2,709 consumers contacted, 1,948 participated in the survey for a re-
sponse rate of 72%.
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Table 3.4: Survey Respondents per State
State EPR Legislation Landfill Bans Complete Responses Percent of Total
Arizona No No 70 4%
Florida No No 72 4%
Maine No Yes 76 4%
Ohio No No 86 4%
Tennessee No No 72 4%
Wyoming No No 65 3%
Conneticut Yes Yes 281 14%
Michigan Yes No 398 20%
New York Yes Yes 369 19%
Oregon Yes Yes 369 19%
Texas Yes No 90 5%
Total 1948 100%
3.4 Empirical Model
To determine the key drivers of consumers’ e-waste disposal choices, we use a multino-
mial choice (MNL) model. This model is based on random utility theory (McFadden,
1978) and is used to predict the probability that an alternative is chosen, given a set
of independent variables. The utility function for a MNL model is defined as
Uni = β′ixni + εni
= Vni + εni
(3.1)
where Uni is the total utility derived from alternative i for individual n; Vni is
the observed portion of the utility; and β′ is the vector of parameters associated
with attributes x. Utility is a linear function of the x attributes which vary across
individuals and alternatives, and εni is the unobserved portion of the utility function.
In our model, a consumer makes a disposal choice among the three alternatives
in the choice set C = {Trash, Store, and Recycle}. The utility associated with each
of the alternatives for respondent n is estimated as:
Vni = β̂ixni + εni (3.2)
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where i=0,1,2 represents the alternatives Trash, Store, and Recycle respectively
and β̂i represents a vector of parameter estimates of βi. In equation 3.2, xni is a
vector that of attributes which vary across alternatives i and individuals n. Using
the ERCC survey data, xni includes information on the presence of EPR legislation,
consumers’ awareness of recycling legislation, consumers’ attitudes towards recycling
activities, and demographic information.
We assume that the error terms are independently and identically Gumbel dis-
tributed. Accordingly, the probability that consumer n chooses alternative i among






In addition, the odds that consumer n will choose alternative i over alternative j






We estimated our model using the mlogit command in Stata 14. Recall that prior
to collecting the survey data, participating state environmental agencies determined
the number of consumers to be surveyed within a state, according to their desired
level of response confidence. Since our data samples were collected using state-level
strata, the usual standard errors associated with the model above are incorrect as
they do not adjust for the lack of independence (Long and Freese, 2006; Korn and
Graubard, 1990). To address this issue, we employ the svy command as suggested by
Long and Freese (2006) and obtain model estimates that account for the stratification
of our data.
Last, to assess model fit, we performed a series of tests to confirm the inde-
pendence of variable values (Wald), test whether the disposal options should be com-
bined (Likelihood Ratio Test), and confirm the independence of irrelevant alternatives
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(Small-Hsiao) as suggested by Long and Freese (2006). The results from these tests
validate our model assumptions.
3.5 Results
The results from our MNL model that describe how e-waste legislation and consumer
attributes affect consumers’ disposal choices are presented in Table 3.5. To provide
general, high level insights, we first provide model output for the three grouped
disposal options — Recycle, Store, and Trash — as follows:
1. Columns I - III and VII - VIIII show the model output with Trash as the
reference category. Note that in a multinomial model the reference category is
the category used to compare differences.
2. Columns IV - VI show the model output with Store as the reference category.
3. Columns I, IV, and VII present the coefficient values. These values indicate the
rates at which the predicted log odds increase or decrease with each successive
unit of an independent variable. The significance level and standard error for
each coefficient are also shown in the columns to the right.
4. Columns III, VI, and IX list the odds ratios for each variable level. In MNL
models, odds ratios (OR) are used to explain the dynamics among the outcomes.
Further, the ORs for a variable represent how the odds change with a unit
increase in that variable, holding all other variables constant. In our model,
the ORs describe the odds that a consumer will choose disposal choice i over
disposal choice j for a given variable value.
In addition to understanding the dynamics between the outcomes, we are inter-
ested in understanding the marginal effects of the variables in our model. Further, a
potential limitation of odds ratios is that the odds can be large in magnitude, even
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when the underlying probabilities of occurrence are low. Thus, to complement the
OR calculations, we compute the average marginal effects for all the variables in our
model. Note that for this analysis, we compute the marginal effects for the six un-
grouped disposal choices, and provide the corresponding OR calculations in Table
B.2 in the appendix. Marginal effects show the change in probability of an outcome,
for a unit change in x, while holding all other variables constant at a specified value.
In our model, and as as shown in Table 3.6, the marginal effects describe the change
in probability that a consumer will choose a disposal choice, while holding all other
variables at their respective mean values.
3.5.1 Effects of Consumer Attributes: Awareness
Our results show that consumers’ awareness of e-waste landfill bans does impact their
e-waste disposal choices. Specifically, awareness decreases the odds that consumer will
recycle versus store their electronics by a factor of 0.71. Stated differently, consumers’
awareness of landfill bans increases the odds that they will store instead of recycle their
electronics by a factor of 1.4. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence that consumers’
awareness of landfill bans increases their odds to recycle electronic products compared
with the odds of the other disposal choices.
We find that consumers’ awareness of e-waste recycling locations also plays a
significant role in consumers’ disposal choices. The odds of consumers recycling ver-
sus trashing their e-waste is almost four times higher for consumers who are some-
what aware of recycling locations. The odds of consumers recycling versus trashing
their e-waste is over five times higher for consumers who are aware of recycling loca-
tions. More specifically, the probability that consumers recycle in-store or using the
town/county recycling center increases by 22 and 19 percentage points, respectively.
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Table 3.5: MNL Model with Grouped Disposal as DV
Recycle vs. Trash Recycle vs. Store Store vs Trash
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Coef. Std. Error Odds ratio Coef. Std. Error Odds ratio Coef. Std. Error Odds ratio
1. EPR: Yes 0.44∗ 0.21 1.55 0.06 0.18 1.06 0.38 0.24 1.46
1. LEGALAWARENESS: Yes 0.07 0.22 1.07 -0.34∗ 0.16 0.71 0.41 0.25 1.50
1. LOCTAWARENESS: Maybe 1.37∗∗∗ 0.23 3.92 1.17 0.19 3.92 0.20 0.28 1.22
2. LOCTAWARENESS: Yes 1.67∗∗∗ 0.26 5.30 1.48∗∗∗ 0.20 4.41 0.18 0.30 1.20
2. IMPORTANCE: Not very -0.08 0.66 0.95 -0.65 0.95 0.52 0.56 0.88 1.76
3. IMPORTANCE: Neutral 1.03̂ 0.58 2.80 0.25 0.87 1.28 0.78 0.82 2.18
4. IMPORTANCE: Somewhat Important 1.95∗∗ 0.57 7.06 -0.32 0.84 0.73 2.28∗∗ 0.80 9.74
5. IMPORTANCE: Very Important 2.34∗∗∗ 0.57 10.41 0.02 0.85 10.41 2.32∗∗ 0.81 10.17
1. INFOSOURCE: General 0.41 0.34 1.51 1.19∗∗∗ 0.31 3.30 -0.78∗ 0.40 0.46
2. INFOSOURCE: Government 0.76∗ 0.36 2.14 1.08∗∗∗ 0.30 2.94 -0.32 0.40 0.73
3. INFOSOURCE: Retailer Manufacturer 0.55 0.39 1.74 0.77∗∗ 0.34 2.66 -0.42 0.46 0.65
4. INFOSOURCE: Non Profit 0.77∗ 0.38 2.16 1.09∗∗∗ 0.32 2.98 -0.32 0.44 0.73
1. PREVENT: Too Expensive -1.19 0.77 0.31 -0.60 0.47 0.55 -0.59 0.89 0.55
2. PREVENT: Inconvenient Location -1.73∗ 0.74 0.18 -1.06∗ 0.45 0.35 -0.67 0.86 0.51
3. PREVENT: Unable to Transport -1.13 0.75 0.32 -0.22 0.47 0.81 -0.91 0.88 0.40
4. PREVENT: Unaware of Location -1.57∗ 0.73 0.21 -0.87∗ 0.46 0.42 -0.70 0.86 0.50
1. RURAL: Yes -0.23 0.19 0.78 -0.37∗∗ 0.15 0.69 0.14 0.22 1.16
2. AGE: 36-45 0.35 0.29 1.43 0.05 0.20 2.95 0.31 0.32 0.58
3. AGE: 46-55 0.00 0.25 0.98 0.94∗∗∗ 0.23 2.55 -0.94∗∗ 0.31 0.39
4. AGE: 56-65 0.44 0.28 1.49 1.09∗∗∗ 0.24 2.95 -0.65∗ 0.33 0.52
5. AGE: 66+ 0.60̂ 0.34 1.82 1.14∗∗∗ 0.29 3.13 -0.54 0.41 0.58
2. DISTANCE: 1-5 miles 0.61∗∗ 0.23 1.83 0.45 0.28 1.57 -0.47∗∗ 0.41 0.62
3. DISTANCE: 6-10 miles 0.38 0.25 1.46 0.33 0.27 1.39 0.25 0.40 1.29
4. DISTANCE: 11-20 miles 0.02̂ 0.34 1.02 0.54 0.29 1.42 -0.19 0.42 0.83
***p < .001, ** p <.01, *p<.05, ∧ p<.1
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Table 3.6: Marginal Effects from Ungrouped Disposal MNL Model
Variables Trash (Std. Error) Store (Std. Error) Family (Std. Error) Donate (Std. Error) ReStore (Std. Error) ReTown (Std. Error)
1. EPR: Yes −0.03∗∗ (-0.02) -0.01 (-0.02) -0.03 (-0.02) 0.02 (-0.03) 0 (-0.02) 0.05∗∗∗ (-0.02)
2. IMPORTANCE: Not very 0 (-0.14) 0.07 (-0.08) 0.01 (-0.1) 0.14 (-0.1) -0.15 (-0.13) -0.06 (-0.09)
3. IMPORTANCE: Neutral -0.18 (-0.13) 0 (-0.06) 0.08 (-0.09) 0.26∗∗∗ (-0.08) -0.15 (-0.12) -0.02 (-0.09)
4. IMPORTANCE: Somewhat Important −0.28∗∗ (-0.13) 0.07 (-0.06) 0.02 (-0.09) 0.21∗∗∗ (-0.08) -0.08 (-0.12) 0.06 (-0.08)
5. IMPORTANCE: Very Important −0.30∗∗ (-0.13) 0.03 (-0.06) -0.02 (-0.09) 0.27∗∗∗ (-0.07) -0.04 (-0.12) 0.06 (-0.08)
1. INFOSOURCE: General -0.01 (-0.03) −0.16∗∗∗ (-0.05) -0.02 (-0.05) 0.18∗∗∗ (-0.05) 0 (-0.05) 0.01 (-0.05)
2. INFOSOURCE: Government -0.04 (-0.03) −0.14∗∗∗ (-0.05) -0.03 (-0.04) 0.09∗ (-0.05) -0.04 (-0.05) 0.15∗∗∗ (-0.05)
3. INFOSOURCE: Retailer Manufacturer -0.02 (-0.03) −0.13∗∗ (-0.06) -0.01 (-0.05) 0.13∗∗ (-0.06) 0.12∗∗ (-0.06) −0.08∗ (-0.05)
4. INFOSOURCE: Non Profit -0.03 (-0.03) −0.14∗∗ (-0.05) 0.05 (-0.05) 0.15∗∗∗ (-0.05) 0.03 (-0.05) -0.07 (-0.05)
1. LEGALAWARENESS: Yes -0.01 (-0.01) 0.04∗∗ (-0.02) 0.01 (-0.02) −0.05∗ (-0.03) -0.01 (-0.02) 0.01 (-0.02)
1. LOCTAWARENESS: Maybe −0.09∗∗∗ (-0.02) −0.14∗∗∗ (-0.03) -0.04 (-0.03) 0.06∗∗ (-0.03) 0.12∗∗∗ (-0.02) 0.08∗∗∗ (-0.02)
2. LOCTAWARENESS: Yes −0.10∗∗∗ (-0.02) −0.16∗∗∗ (-0.02) −0.10∗∗∗ (-0.03) -0.04 (-0.03) 0.22∗∗∗ (-0.02) 0.19∗∗∗ (-0.02)
1. PREVENT: Too Expensive 0.04∗ (-0.02) 0.04 (-0.04) 0.03 (-0.06) 0.02 (-0.06) -0.03 (-0.04) −0.09∗ (-0.05)
2. PREVENT: Inconvenient Location 0.07∗∗∗ (-0.02) 0.09∗∗ (-0.04) -0.03 (-0.06) 0.03 (-0.06) -0.03 (-0.04) −0.13∗∗∗ (-0.05)
3. PREVENT: Unable to Transport 0.03∗ (-0.02) 0 (-0.04) -0.03 (-0.06) 0.07 (-0.06) -0.03 (-0.04) -0.06 (-0.05)
4. PREVENT: Unaware of Location 0.06∗∗∗ (-0.02) 0.06* (-0.04) -0.03 (-0.05) -0.01 (-0.06) -0.03 (-0.04) -0.05 (-0.05)
1. RURAL: Yes 0.01 (-0.01) 0.04∗∗ (-0.02) -0.01 (-0.02) −0.04∗ (-0.02) -0.03 (-0.02) 0.03∗ (-0.02)
2. AGE: 36-45 -0.02 (-0.02) 0 (-0.03) -0.03 (-0.03) 0.03 (-0.04) -0.01 (-0.02) 0.04∗ (-0.02)
3. AGE: 46-55 0 (-0.02) −0.10∗∗∗ (-0.02) −0.06∗∗ (-0.03) -0.05 (-0.03) 0 (-0.02) 0.21∗∗∗ (-0.03)
4. AGE: 56-65 -0.02 (-0.01) −0.11∗∗∗ (-0.02) −0.12∗∗∗ (-0.03) 0 (-0.03) 0.06∗∗ (-0.03) 0.19∗∗∗ (-0.03)
5. AGE: 66+ −0.03∗ (-0.02) −0.12∗∗∗ (-0.02) −0.09∗∗∗ (-0.03) -0.06 (-0.04) 0.06∗∗ (-0.03) 0.25∗∗∗ (-0.04)
2. DISTANCE: 1-5 miles 0.01 (-0.03) -0.06 (-0.04) 0.04 (-0.04) -0.01 (-0.05) 0 (-0.04) 0.02 (-0.03)
3. DISTANCE: 6-10 miles -0.03 (-0.02) -0.04 (-0.04) 0.06∗ (-0.04) 0.03 (-0.05) -0.04 (-0.03) 0.02 (-0.03)
4. DISTANCE: 11-20 miles -0.02 (-0.02) -0.06 (-0.04) 0.05 (-0.04) 0.04 (-0.05) -0.02 (-0.04) 0.02 (-0.03)
***p < .001, ** p <.01, *p<.05, ∧ p<.1
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The probability that consumers reuse their electronic waste, in the form of giving
unwanted items to family members, decreases by 10 percentage points. Finally, the
probability that consumers choose a non-sustainable disposal option such as storing
or trashing their electronics decreases by 16 and 10 percentage points, respectively.
From the odds ratios of our MNL model, we see that nonprofit and government
sources are two of the most effective e-waste information sources. Compared to con-
sumers who have not received information on e-waste recycling locations, consumers
who receive information through nonprofit and government sources are over 2 times
more likely to recycle rather than trash their electronics. These information sources
also increase the odds that consumers will recycle rather than store their electron-
ics by a factor of nearly 3. In general, the other information sources also result in
positive e-waste disposal behavior. Information from retailers and manufacturers in-
creases the odds that consumers will recycle rather than store their electronics by a
factor of 2.6 and information from general sources (such as newspapers, the internet,
etc.) increases the odds that consumers will recycle rather than store their electronic
by a factor of 3.3. From our marginal effects calculations, and, as one might suspect,
we find that the information sources correspond with consumers’ ultimate disposal
choices (see Figure 3.2). For example, the probability that consumers recycle using
government and town services increases by 15 percentage points for those who receive
information on e-waste recycling from the government.
3.5.2 Effects of Consumer Attributes: Attitudes
Our model results show that, consistent with previous literature, consumers’ interest
in e-waste activities strongly affects their disposal choices. The odds of consumers
recycling versus trashing their e-waste is 7.06 times higher for consumers who stated
that recycling was somewhat important to them, and 10.41 times higher for consumers
who stated that recycling was very important to them. Additionally, the odds of con-
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Figure 3.2: Predictions of E-Waste Disposal Choice Based on Consumers’ InfoSource
sumers storing rather than trashing their e-waste is 9.74 times higher for consumers
who stated that recycling was somewhat important to them and 10.17 times higher
for consumers who stated that recycling was very important to them. We did not find
evidence that the odds of consumers’ relative disposal choices were effected if con-
sumers stated that they were “neutral” or that recycling was “not very” important
to them. Results from our marginal calculations complemented these findings: the
probability that consumers trash their electronics decreases by 30 percentage points
for those who stated that recycling was “very important” to them (see Figure 3.3).
Our results suggest that consumers’ perceived barriers to recycling significantly
increase the probability that they will trash or store their electronics. From our odds
ratio calculations, we find that the odds that consumers recycle versus trash or store
their electronics decreases when e-waste recycling location is unknown (OR = 0.21)
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or inconvenient (OR = 0.18). Indeed our marginal effect calculations confirm that,
of the options tested, the probability that consumers trash their electronics is most
influenced by these location factors. The probability that consumers trash their elec-
tronics increases by 7 percentage points for those who indicated that “inconvenient
locations” were their top barrier to recycling, and by 6 percentage points for those
who indicated that “unawareness of location” was a top preventer. The other fac-
tors, expense and transportation, also increase the probability that consumers trash
their electronics, but to a lesser extent. The probability that consumers trash their
electronics increases by 4 percentage points for those who indicated that expense was
their top barrier to recycling, and by 3 percentage points for those who indicated that
transportation issues was a top concern.
We found limited insights on effects of distance on consumers’ disposal choices.
From the odds ratio calculations, we find that the odds that consumers recycle versus
trash increases by a factor of 1.83 when recycling locations are between the 1-5 mile
range versus the 21+ mile range. Additionally, the results from our marginal analysis
suggest that the probability that consumers give their electronics to their family
members increases by 6 percentage points when recycling locations are between the
6-10 mile range.
3.5.3 Effects of E-Waste Legislation
From our model calculations, we find that the odds of consumers choosing to recycle
versus throwing items in the trash are approximately 1.6 times higher for states with
EPR legislation for e-waste versus states without EPR legislation for e-waste. This
finding provides support for the argument that EPR promotes e-waste recycling;
however, it also sheds light on the relative impact of legislation versus consumer
attributes. For example, our marginal effect calculations show that for states with
EPR legislation in place, the probability that consumers use the town and county
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Figure 3.3: Predictions of E-Waste Disposal Choice Based on Importance of Recycling
to Consumer
recycling options increases by 5 percentage points (see Figure 3.4). Additionally, the
probability that consumers trash their electronics decreases by 3 percentage points.
3.5.4 Consumer Demographics
Consistent with previous literature, we find that older consumers are more likely
to recycle their electronics versus throw them in the trash: compared to consumers
who are between the ages of 18 and 35, the odds of consumers recycling rather than
storing their e-waste are 2.5 times higher for consumers who are between the ages
of 36 and 45, 2.95 times higher for consumers between the ages of 56 and 65, and
and 3.3 times higher for consumers who are 66 or older. Finally our results suggest
that consumers living in rural areas are more likely to store their electronics rather
than recycle them: the probability that consumers choose the store disposal option
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Figure 3.4: Predictions of E-Waste Disposal Choice Based on Presence of EPR Leg-
islation
increases by 4 percentage points for consumers living in these locations.
3.6 Conclusion and Future Research Directions
The recent surge in e-waste generation poses vexing problems for regulators seeking
to protect human health and the environment, and for manufacturers seeking to
comply with various educational and legislative policies. Although several states in
the US have adopted such approaches, the effectiveness of these policies (in particular,
EPR for e-waste) in promoting consumer recycling continues to be questioned. In
response, and through use of consumer survey data, we investigate the effects of e-
waste legislation and consumer attributes on consumers’ disposal choices to provide
clarity to this debate.
The marginal effects of e-waste legislation on consumer e-waste disposal choices
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from our analysis are summarized in Figure 3.5. We find that that both legislative
options (EPR and landfill bans) affect consumers’ e-waste disposal behavior. The
presence of EPR legislation, for example, increases the likelihood that consumers
will choose to recycle and decreases the likelihood that consumers will trash their
e-waste. However, in the case of landfill bans, we find that the legislation’s im-
pact on consumers’ disposal choices may be different from the envisioned outcomes.
Specifically, our results show that consumers’ awareness of landfill bans increases the
likelihood that they will store their electronics. While storing e-waste is preferred to
consumers’ throwing their used electronics in the trash, ideally landfill bans would
also promote recycling. Even if consumers are temporarily storing their electronics,
as noted by Sabbaghi et al. (2015) time delays can increase the obsolescence rate
of potentially still-functional products and lead to fewer recovery opportunities such
as reuse, upgrade, and refurbishment. Thus, our results suggest that efforts that
focus on informing consumers about the dangers of e-waste and where they can re-
cycle their electronic products may need to be coupled with e-waste legislation and
to significantly promote e-waste recycling.
For instance, we find that e-waste location awareness plays a significant role in
consumers’ disposal decisions. The odds of consumers recycling rather than throwing
the items away in the trash or storing them significantly increases with awareness
levels. In addition, of the options explored, consumers named inconvenient recycling
locations and not knowing where to go as the biggest deterrents to recycling. Last,
as regulators seek to improve awareness levels, our results show that consumers often
seek information from a variety of sources and that all are effective in reducing the
probability that consumers throw their electronics away in the trash. We note that
consumers ultimate disposal choice is highly influenced by their original information
source. In states such as New York and Indiana where manufacturers are required
and sometimes struggle to meet annual collection targets, these results suggest that
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Figure 3.5: Effect of Legislation on Changes in Probability of E-Waste Disposal
Choices
consumers’ disposal behavior may be very responsive to e-waste location information.
Beyond improving consumer knowledge of recycling locations, our results suggest
that administrators of recycling programs should also focus their efforts on educating
consumers about the importance of recycling. Of all the factors tested, appreciation
of recycling was most influential in reducing the likelihood that consumers threw their
electronics items in the trash. Our results also indicate that younger consumers and
those living in rural areas may benefit most from such educational efforts.
There are several limitations to our study which may provide interesting avenues
for future research. First, we focus on consumers’ general e-waste disposal behav-
iors. In practice, consumers’ e-waste behaviors may vary across product types. For
example, cell phones may be easier to dispose of versus products that are in gen-
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eral more expensive to recycle and heavier to transport, such as televisions. Second,
because of data limitations, we were not able to explore how specific differences in
the structure of state legislation may affect consumers’ choices. Finally, again due to
data limitations, we did not explore the effects of Advance Recycling Fees, which are
currently implemented in the state of California. Also due to data limitations, we
were unable to explore interaction effects between the different factors, which may
provide additional insights. Although not exhaustive, the above limitations provide
promising trajectories for further analyses.
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Chapter 4
Using Transactions Data to Improve Consumer
Returns Forecasting
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, offering a generous return policy has become increasingly popular
among U.S. retailers. Eager to win sales, big brick-and-mortar chains such as Walmart
and Target promise a full money back guarantee upon return if customers are not
satisfied with their purchases. Responding to this competitive pressure, Best Buy
famously eliminated its 15% restocking fee for consumer electronics in 2011, aligning
itself with the majority of the U.S. retail industry (Reisinger, 2010).1 In the online
sector, lenient return practices have also become popular, as several retailers even
inlcude free return shipping in their policies (examples include Zappos, Nordstrom,
Gap, and Urban Outfitters).
Behind the trend of lenient return practices the belief that consumers highly
value the option to return products penalty free, which in turn generates higher
demand and better customer satisfaction for the retailer (Mollenkopf et al., 2011).
The recent consumer returns studies offer more specific evidence: Anderson et al.
(2009) and Heiman et al. (2015) estimate that consumers value a full refund policy
for an apparel item purchased through a catalog or physical channel at 10% to 25%
of the product’s price. It has also been shown that frequent returners are associated
1There are retailers that do not accept returns, such as baby products retailer Zulily (Ng, 2015)
and some small-to-medium sized sellers on eBay. To our knowledge, these cases are rare in the whole
retail sector.
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with more frequent, and higher-dollar future purchases (Griffis et al., 2012), stronger
brand loyalty (Ramanathan, 2011), and even larger customer lifetime value (Petersen
and Kumar, 2015). For online retailers, the importance of a generous return policy
can be even more critical to sales. Since consumers are not able to physically inspect
products, a liberal returns policy can help consumers overcome any reluctance to
make a purchase (WSJ, 2017).
While enjoying the demand-side benefits a full refund policy entails, retailers and
OEMs also find the management of returns a challenging task – often ranked among
the top managerial concerns (Brill, 2015). At the macro level, industry research has
estimated the total value of returns that U.S. consumers make annually to be around
$260 billion (Kerr, 2013; Ng, 2015), which makes up roughly 7% of sales for physical
stores and over twice as much for online retailers (approximately 15%). Further, the
National Retail Federation (2008, 2016) has observed a steady increase in average
return rates over the past decade, from 7% to 12%. Adding to the sheer volume
of returns are the operational costs that must occur to ensure their flow along the
reverse supply chain and value recovery through various options. A recent study
by Accenture (Douthit et al., 2011) suggests that return-related operations such as
inspection, reverse logistics, and refurbishment or disposal accounts for 5% of a typical
OEM’s revenue and 4% of a typical retailer’s sales. Overall, just a 1% return rate
has been estimated to cost a large retail chain $17 million (Douthit et al., 2011) and
the whole U.S. economy $32 billion (National Retail Federation, 2016).
Perhaps the most straightforward “solution” to reducing returns is to charge a
restocking fee that limits consumers’ incentive to return. However, given the prevalent
adherence to full refund policies in practice and the strong belief in their marketing
benefits, much of the return management burden falls instead on the operational levers
that reduce costs by optimizing operational decisions along the reverse supply chain,
while treating the return volume as exogenous. Examples include better inventory
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management, reverse logistics, staffing, and product recovery. As described in detail
below, a common crucial input for the effectiveness of these operational decisions is
an accurate return forecast.
From a retailer’s perspective, the influx of returns requires adjustments to inven-
tory policies, since the current level of inventory replenishment should consider the
volume of future returns (Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk, 2009). In such cases, forecasting
returns becomes a prerequisite for determining the order quantity. Similarly, many
other inventory-related tactical decisions along the reverse supply chain also involve
return forecasting, including determining the optimal number of parts for refurbishing
and repairs, the number and location of stock points, and the allocation of inventories
across them (Fleischmann et al., 1997).
Planning for reverse logistics is generally more difficult than coordinating the for-
ward supply chain due to the increased uncertainty in quantity, time, and quality of
returned products (Agrawal et al., 2015). Moreover, returned products often accumu-
late in a warehouse and are eventually routed to a low payback salvage channel be-
cause their value has depreciated past the point of being profitable to remarket. One
of the main reasons for this wasteful practice is that return volumes are not built into
the the logistics network, since there is no reliable forecast for them(Phillips, 2015).
It is reported that the retail sector’s annual spending on reverse logistics for pro-
cessing and disposition of consumer returns is more than $40 billion (Enright, 2003),
and OEMs spend 2 to 3 times more on reverse logistics costs than on the original
outbound logistics of the same product (Stock et al., 2006). The lack of an accurate
returns forecast and the resultant inability to plan effectively are contributing to these
high costs.
As the prominence of returns management increases, how to best staff the return
counter using a reliable returns forecast becomes part of a retailer’s labor planning
process, complementing the existing traffic-based sales force staffing (Chuang et al.,
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2016). Furthermore, with returns moving upstream in the reverse supply chain,
distribution centers and refurbishment centers also face staffing challenges of similar
nature, yet technically more complex. For example, Wal-Mart sends returns to one
of its six regional return centers across the U.S., where employees sort the returned
goods into four tiers. The return flow is highly variable: although 45 million pallets
of returns are processed annually, over 40% of this volume occurs in January and
February after the holiday time period (Souza, 2013b). As a result, Wal-Mart staffs
with seasonal employees. The performance of this approach is highly dependent
on the accuracy of returns forecast. Our conversation with managers at the Bose
refurbishment center in South Carolina2 reveals a similar staffing problem for their
part-time labor force.
The salvage value of a returned merchandise largely depends on the recovery
channel. For consumer electronics, it ranges from as high as 70% value recovery by
selling through an online resell channel to as low as 20% by selling to liquidators
who buy in pallets (Ng, 2015). Other recovery options include reusing for parts,
refurbishing, and recycling. For example, Optoro – a third-party reverse logistics
provider specializing in swift value recovery of electronic products – “recovers” returns
through these various channels based on expected return volume, consumer preference
for open-box items, and discount store demand (Tabuchi, 2015). An accurate return
forecast is again a crucial input parameter. According to Shorewood Liquidators,
who processes returns for Groupon, better planning on the recovery strategy can lift
salvage value from 20% to 50% (Ng and Stevens, 2015). For an OEM who accepts
returns from retailers3, the recovery decision often involves allocating returns between
two options, restocking for open-box sale and earmarking for future warranty demand.
2Bose, a major OEM of high-end consumer audio equipment, operated its only returns pro-
cessing center for the North America market in South Carolina where consumer returns are sorted,
refurbished, and tested.
3Different from the dominance of full refund policies between retailers and consumers, the policy
between OEMs and retailers has a much higher degree of variation (Crocker and Letizia, 2014).
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Pince et al. (2016) derive optimal strategies under such a setting where the future
return forecast is one of the critical inputs in their disposition decision model.
In general, just as more accurate sales forecasts enable retailers and OEMs to
improve their operational performance, more accurate returns forecasts can also in-
crease the effectiveness of return-related decisions along various stages of the reverse
supply chain (Agrawal et al., 2015). Given that 95% of the consumer returns are
“no-problems-found,” the cost saving potential appears promising (Douthit et al.,
2011). Additionally, the operations literature has proposed many decision support
tools for managing returns such as retail store inventory (Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk,
2009), disposition decisions (Pince et al., 2016), and reverse logistics network design
(Guide et al., 2006). All of these models share the common trait that an accurate
return forecast is critical for their successful implementation.
So what methods do companies commonly apply for forecasting consumer returns?
Toktay et al. (2003) find that many rely on simple heuristics such as multiplying
projected sales by the historical return rate of a product or time-series methods such
as ARIMA models. Our conversations with over 15 retailers and OEMs during the
2013, 2014, and 2015 Consumer Returns Annual Conferences confirm that these are
still the most common choices4. Furthermore, although there is a rich stream of
studies on end-of-use or end-of-life returns forecasting, the type of data available
in that context is very different from our context of consumer returns. Specifically,
consumer returns are typically processed by a retailer through Point-Of-Sale (POS)
technologies, which yields a rich transaction-level data set that includes purchase and
return timestamps of each individual transaction. In contrast, historical period-level
(e.g. weekly, monthly) sales and return quantities are the most common data inputs
for end-of-use and end-of-life returns.
4The Consumer Returns Annual Conferences is the largest industry meeting for practitioners
who focus on managing consumer returns. It is annually held in September or October. More details
could be found at http://consumerreturns.wbresearch.com/.
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In response to the need of more accurate returns forecasts and the lack of advanced
methods that effectively utilize the rich transaction-level data available, we propose a
“causal model” approach that predicts future return quantities in two steps. First, we
fit an econometric model that simultaneously estimates the likelihood of a purchase
being returned and how long it takes the consumer to make the keep-versus-return
decision. Based on the purchase timestamp and the estimated model, we compute
a probability for each purchase to be returned in a specific time window (e.g. next
week, month, etc). Second, we aggregate the probabilities across the past purchases
to compute the expected number of returns in that time window. We label this as the
“predict-aggregate” approach. Our econometric model in the first step (predict) has
the flexibility to accommodate two unique features of the consumer returns context.
The first is that consumers differ in how certain they are about their valuations of a
product when they make a purchase. During the trial period, each consumer experi-
ences the product and adjusts her valuation accordingly; the scale of this adjustment
is likely to be larger for those who are ex ante more uncertain. This heterogeneous
nature of trial uncertainty requires the modeling of a non-constant error variance.
The second is that consumers also differ in how long it takes them to sufficiently ex-
perience a given product. Since the retailer cannot observe this duration for products
that are not returned, but only for products that are actually returned, our model
accounts for this sample selection bias.
We test the performance of our model on two large Point-Of-Sale (POS) trans-
actions data sets provided by a major consumer electronics retail chain (Ni et al.,
2012) and an online fashion-jewelry store. Testing on these two datasets has several
advantages and allows us to compare our model’s performance on samples with dif-
ferent return rates, average time-to-return durations, and other key metrics. Further,
managing consumer returns are particularly important for the product types and re-
tail channels represented in our data. For example, the National Retail Federation
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(2016) estimates that return rates for “hard goods,” including consumer electronics,
are 50% more than the average across product categories. Early identification and
processing of returned products is especially important for short life cycle products
such as consumer electronics, which can lose value at a rate greater than 1% per week
(Guide et al., 2006). Thus, better return forecasts can be particularly valuable for
this product category. In addition, consumer electronics have relatively low purchase
frequency compared to other categories such as apparel, which makes the task of
forecasting more difficult. Generating an accurate return forecasts for online sales
(as in our second dataset) can be similarly challenging as e-retailers generally observe
higher return rates and return variability than brick-and-mortar stores.
To assess the performance of our model, we draw from industry practice and the
existing literature to construct benchmark models, which as we discuss in §3 can be
summarized as the “aggregate-predict” approaches. The performance comparison be-
tween our proposed predict-aggregate (P-A) and the existing aggregate-predict (A-P)
approaches is presented in a sequential manner. We start with a “bare-bones” version
of our approach, which already shows significant accuracy gains over common prac-
tice benchmarks. We then add heteroskedasticity and sample selection components
to our model, showing how each addition improves the forecast accuracy. In addition,
since the time-to-return distribution might exhibit shapes quite different from what
we observe in our data, we make a methodological generalization to our econometric
model in an extension. In light of the spike of same-day return observed in the return
lag data, we also consider a “two-part” model that explicitly accounts for the high
volume of same day returns in another extension.
4.2 Literature Review
An emerging stream of literature in the closed-loop supply chain area studies the
forecasting problem of end-of-use and end-of-life returns. For example, Toktay et al.
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(2000) examine the case of Kodak’s single-use cameras and Clottey et al. (2012) ex-
pand on this work by considering alternative distributions for the return lag. Li et al.
(2011) apply count regression techniques to forecast trade-in returns in a business-to-
business context. The consumer returns context is different in that the relevant data
is most often collected by retailer POS technologies, resulting in rich transaction-level
information such as purchase and return timestamps. Naturally, how to effectively
utilize the granularity of this transaction-level data becomes an important empirical
question. To our knowledge, Daim et al. (2012) is the only study that forecasts con-
sumer returns. Their approach is to first aggregate the transactions data into weekly
sales and returns, and then predict future returns using a moving average of return
percentages5, which as we discuss in the next section belongs to the family of our
A-P benchmark approach. In contrast, our P-A approach better utilizes POS data
by predicting the probability of a return for each individual purchase through an
econometric model, and then aggregates these probabilities into period-level return
quantities. In addition, our econometric model captures two transaction-level out-
come variables, return probability and experience duration, through a very general
setup. While they do not forecast the quantity of returns, Hess and Mayhew (1997)
suggest the use of a logistic regression for predicting the return probability and a
five-parameter non-negative survival distribution for return lag. Our general model
nests their suggested setup as a special case, which allows us to test how their setup
fares for consumer returns forecasting (discussed in detail in Appendix C.4).
The process flow of our P-A forecasting approach is in spirit analogous to the
bottom-up method often found in the context of time-series sales forecasting. Con-
5The authors apply this approach to three categories of camcorder returns based on return
reason code. Despite the theoretical appeal of using reason codes, it is well known in the consumer
returns industry that these codes are rarely reliable. First, consumers often claim that the product
is broken when making a return even though this is rarely the case. Second, return counter staff tend
to select the most convenient reason code (often the first one on a drop down list) when processing
consumer returns.
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sider a television manufacturer who needs to predict demand for its assortment of
TV models. Based on historical sales for each SKU, the bottom-up method first
creates individual time-series forecasts at the SKU-level and then sums them up to
generate the sales forecast for the whole assortment of TVs. The efficiency of top-
down and bottom-up methods has been examined empirically in multiple contexts
including telephone demand (Dunn et al., 1971), multiple-competition (Dangerfield
and Morris, 1992), and market earnings (Kinney, 1971). More recently, Kremer et al.
(2015) consider the effects of behavioral factors on the accuracy of these models. The
accuracy and efficiency of the bottom-up method is often compared with the alter-
native top-down method, where the assortment-level forecast is created before being
partitioned into individual SKU-level forecasts (e.g. Dangerfield and Morris, 1992;
Kremer et al., 2015). A common finding from these studies is that the bottom-up
method often outperforms the top-down. The comparison between our P-A approach
and the benchmark A-P approaches for forecasting consumer returns resembles the
top-down vs. bottom-up comparison in the sales forecasting literature and yields a
similar finding: the P-A approach, which conducts predictions at the bottom level,
outperforms the A-P approach. As we explain in later sections, however, the P-A
approach requires a much more sophisticated econometric treatment than do most
bottom-up forecasting methods for new product sales.
4.3 Forecasting Approach
Consider an empirical setting where a retailer collects transaction-level data through
POS technologies. While the collected data will likely encompass product, transac-
tion, and consumer characteristics, we focus only on the timestamps of purchase and
return to demonstrate the performance of our forecasting approach relative to bench-
marks. Note that additional predictors can be easily added to our approach, which
we discuss in §4.6.4. Before moving into model details, we contextualize the forecast-
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ing problem, discuss the conceptual difference between two potential approaches, and
provide intuition on why the P-A approach exhibits superior performance.
4.3.1 A Conceptual Comparison between Two Approaches
Figure 4.1: Existing and Proposed Return
Forecasting Approaches
Figure 4.1 presents different paths for using POS data to forecast return quan-
tities. The starting point is the raw data of purchase and return timestamps (left
bottom quadrant). To achieve the goal of predicting the number of returns in a
given period (upper right quadrant), such as a month, the forecaster can take two
paths. The existing forecasting methods require the forecaster to first aggregate the
transaction-level timestamps into period-level sales and return quantities and then
predict future returns based on these historical quantities. Thus, with the A-P ap-
proach the forecasting model is applied at the period level. In doing so, the forecaster
can choose to ignore the aggregated sales quantities and rely solely on historical re-
turn quantities to fit a time-series model such as an ARIMA model (Path 1), as is
often done in practice. Alternatively, she can exploit the fact that future returns come
from past sales and predict returns through a regression model (Path 2), which is the
typical approach used in forecasting end-of-life returns. We propose a forecasting
approach that deviates substantially from these existing methods – we predict return
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probabilities at the transaction-level and then aggregate these individual probabilities
into return quantities (Path 3). In other words, our proposed method follows a P-A
path, which applies a forecasting model at the transaction-level. Next, we provide
some intuition on why the P-A path might better utilize POS data and thus deliver
superior performance.













Sales (divided by ten)
Returns
Figure 4.2: An Example of Time Se-
ries of Sales and Returns (generated
from the audio speaker category in our
data set)
Figure 4.2 depicts a typical series of monthly returns data, generated from the
audio speaker category in our data set. To illustrate the relationship between sales
and returns, we overlay the returns with the series of monthly sales data. We make
several observations from Figure 4.2 to help explain our intuition. First, the return-
series lags behind the sales series, which is especially obvious during the period when
sales fall back to normal levels after the holiday season. For example, while the sales
volume decreases sharply from December to January, the decrease in the volume
of returns appears to lag behind by at least a month. The time that consumers
take to experience their purchases contributes to the lag of return for individual
purchases, which in turn aggregates to the phenomenon of monthly returns lagging
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behind monthly sales. Second, when sales quantities are relatively stable, such as
between February and October, the return quantities appear to be more volatile.
This suggests the number of returns is much noisier than what can be captured by a
simple product of the average return rate and the sales volume. One major driver of
this noisiness is the purchase timestamps within each month, which might vary from
month to month. For example, a sale in the latter part of a month is more likely to
contribute to the next month’s returns than to the current month’s. Apart from the
timing of purchases, the heterogeneity of the return probability and the return lag
across individual transactions also gives rise to the fluctuation in return quantities.
When a retailer or an OEM forecasts the quantity of returns for a given period of time,
both the lagging behavior of returns and its noisiness are better captured through a
transaction-level model than an aggregate model. Therefore, while our proposed P-A
and the existing A-P methods both start with purchase and return timestamps, the
former utilizes the available data more effectively.
4.3.3 Model Building
While both A-P and P-A approaches can predict the number of returns for any
arbitrary period of time, we will compare their performance on monthly returns since
this is a common planning time segment for both OEMs and retailers. The total
number of returns t in a given month j, (Rtj) can be decomposed into two parts: those
attributed to the sales completed in the previous months, (Rj), and those attributed
to the current month’s sales, (Rcj). At the end of month j− 1, the existing purchases
contribute to Rj but not to Rcj. In order for our proposed approach to predict Rcj, we
need a predicted purchase pattern for month j, which adds additional noise to the
return forecasts. Therefore, to minimize this additional noise introduced by the sales
forecast and ensure a clean comparison among different methods, we focus our main
analysis on the prediction of Rj. In §4.6.5, we extend our analysis to predict Rtj by
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employing a simple sales forecast.
In the following, we build our forecasting model in three steps, starting with a
basic version, which enables us to outline its procedures in a straightforward manner.
Then, we address two important econometric challenges that arise in a returns context
– heterogeneous return probability and its correlation with experience duration. Our
performance testing in §4.5.2 is synchronized with these steps. Presenting our results
in this manner has two benefits. First, it helps demonstrate that superior forecasting
performance can be achieved even with a reasonably simple setup under the P-A
approach. Second, the predictive value of each additional model component becomes
more evident.
Basic Model.
For a given purchase i, denote its probability of being returned in a future month as
Pij, which is the joint probability of two events happening together – the consumer
has had sufficient time to experience the purchased product i by month j and the
consumer decides to return product i. Label the probabilities for the two events as
P rij for the return and P dij for the duration probabilities, respectively. If we assume a
consumer’s decision to return is independent from the required time for her to experi-
ence the product, we have Pij = P rij×P dij. Furthermore, if we assume a homogeneous
return probability across purchases, P rij is essentially the return rate in the estimation
sample. These two assumptions are relaxed in following sections. Denote the time
it takes the buyer of i to fully experience this product as di. Let the timestamp for
purchase i be ti and that for the start and end dates of month j be tstartj and tendj . It
follows that P dij is the probability that di is between tstartj − ti and tendj − ti, both of
which are always positive since we are looking at future months. Let the CDF of di
be Fd so that P dij is simply Fd(tendj − ti) − Fd(tstartj − ti). Grounded in the empirical
characteristics of our data (see §4.4), we assume di follows a log-normal distribution
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such that log(di) is normally distributed, N (µd, σd). We later generalize the distri-
butional choice in §4.6.2. The parameters µd and σd can be estimated through the
linear regression: log(di) = µd + εd, where the error term εd is a zero mean normal
distribution with variance σ2d and log(di) is the logged return lag. We estimate the
log-normal duration through the fitdist command in R. The above constitutes the
predict step in our proposed P-A approach.
Next, we turn to the aggregate step. Because each purchase that happened before
month j has a non-zero probability of being returned in month j and these probabili-
ties are not equal, the total number of returns in month j follows a Poisson-Binomial
distribution. Thus, the sum of these Bernoulli probabilities is R̂j =
∑Nj
i=1 Pij, where
Nj is the total number of purchases made before month j.
4.4 Data
To test the performance of our proposed approach, we apply our model on data
from two different retailers (Table 4.1). The first, is the Ni et al. (2012) data set of
consumer electronics transactions published in Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management. In an effort to promote quality empirical research, the Institute for
Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) encourages scholars
to publish unique and comprehensive data sets. The outcomes of this effort includes
three data sets published inManufacturing & Service Operations Management (Bodea
et al., 2009; Willems, 2008; Mumbower and Garrow, 2014) and four in Marketing
Science (Ni et al., 2012; Bronnenberg et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2014; Goldenberg
et al., 2010). We make use of the Ni et al. (2012) data since the publishers suggest
that it is by far the most comprehensive data set of consumer electronics transactions
available, and encourage researchers to specifically leverage it for product return
issues (p. 1012). The original data contains 173, 262 transactions provided by a
major U.S. electronics chain, the identity of which, for confidentiality reasons, is not
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Table 4.1: Description of the Datasets
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
Product Type Consumer Electronics Fashion Jewerly
Retail Channel Brick-and-Mortar Online Only
Number of Categories 9: Audio, Auto Parts, Cable, 5: Accessories, Bracelets,
Computer Imaging, Mble Earrings, Necklaces, and Rings
Phone, Phone, TV,
and TV Box
Return Policy No Specified Limit 30 Days and Free Return Shipping
Date of Transactions December 1998 - October 2001 December 2015 - April 2017
Number of Transactions 85,725 616,127
provided. All returns at this retailer are accepted open-box and given a full refund.
The transactions in this data set took place between December 1998 and November
2004. We limit our attention to a subset of the original data that is applicable to
our analysis (the specific subsetting procedure is described in Appendix C.1). The
remaining applicable data for our analysis contains 85, 725 transactions spanning
across nine product categories.
The second data set leveraged in our analysis was provided by an online jewelry
retailer. The identity of this retailer is again masked for confidentiality reasons. We
make use of this additional data to test the robustness of our model and gain in-
sights on how differences in return lag, return rates, and other key metrics impact
our model’s performance. The retailers’ return policy states that merchandise can be
returned within 30 days; however, this return policy is not heavily enforced. In ad-
dition, the retailer does not charge a restocking fee and return shipping is free. The
original data set contains 620,470 transactions that took place between December
2015 and April 2017. We exclude transactions in which the product categories could
not be identified (approximately .03% of our observations). The remaining applicable
data for our analysis contains 616, 127 transactions spanning across five product cat-
egories. In the following we discuss key variable definitions and descriptive statistics
of both datasets.
Since each purchase may or may not be returned, each observation takes either
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Table 4.2: Purchase and Return
Timestamps Example
Category Purchase Date Return Date
Audio 1-Dec-2001 .
TV 1-Dec-2001 10-Jan-2002
one of the two forms shown in Table 4.2. Return lag is calculated by differencing the
purchase and return timestamps. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide descriptive statistics for
the return rate and lag of each category. The average return rate for our electronics
data matches closely with the 12% average for consumer electronics reported by the
National Retail Federation (2016), and the average return lag ranges from 12 days to
30 days. The average return rate for our jewelry data is 7% and the average return lag
for this data is between 23 and 24 days (the National Retail Federation (2016) does
not report a return rate for this category of merchandise). To gain some exploratory
insights into the distribution of the return lag, we present a histogram of both data
sets in Figure 4.3. The shape of these histograms resembles a lognormal distribution
with a small mean and a fairly large variance, except that the spike at same-day
return is substantial in the electronics data. Therefore, while we use the lognormal
distribution to model return lag in §4.3.3, we generalize our approach to allow for
other distributions as an extension in §4.6.2. In light of the spike at return lag = 1,
we also consider a “two-part” duration model that explicitly accounts for the high
volume of same day returns in another extension in §4.6.3.
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Table 4.3: Return Lag and Return Rate Descriptive Statistics for Electronics Dataset
Return Rate Return Lag Total Observations
Category Average Std. Dev. Coeff. of Var. Average Std. Dev. Coeff. of Var.
Audio 12% 0.32 2.76 12.9 20.0 1.6 11,367
Auto Parts 14% 0.35 2.44 21.9 54.1 2.5 7,211
Cable 11% 0.31 2.91 10.9 19.8 1.8 9,398
Computer 11% 0.31 2.90 11.1 23.0 2.1 21,811
Imaging 11% 0.31 2.92 11.8 19.9 1.7 7,823
Mobile Phone 16% 0.37 2.27 28.9 74.4 2.6 3,126
Phone 14% 0.35 2.47 16.1 30.6 1.9 5,777
TV 8% 0.28 3.28 11.3 21.5 1.9 9,413
TV Box 14% 0.34 2.52 14.7 28.5 1.9 9,799
Sample Average 12% 0.33 2.72 15.5 32.4 2.0 1,201.05
Table 4.4: Return Lag and Return Rate Descriptive Statistics for Jewelry Dataset
Return Rate Return Lag Total Observations
Category Average Std. Dev. Coeff. of Var. Average Std. Dev. Coeff. of Var.
Accessories 4% 0.19 5.18 23.28 19.69 0.85 20,583
Bracelets 7% 0.26 3.64 22.70 14.71 0.65 61,997
Earrings 8% 0.27 3.46 24.40 17.30 0.71 308,385
Necklaces 7% 0.25 3.67 23.74 18.12 0.76 255,470
Rings 8% 0.27 3.43 24.94 23.01 0.92 51,121
Sample Average 7% 0.25 3.87 23.81 18.57 0.78 616,127
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Table 4.5: Monthly Sales and Returns (Electronics Dataset)
Sales Returns
Category Months Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Audio 71 158.23 182.47 6.44 8.39
Auto Parts 71 100.08 90.36 4.99 4.19
Cable 71 130.97 202.46 3.46 4.52
Computer 71 302.99 421.42 8.73 8.69
Imaging 71 107.30 102.46 3.92 3.74
Mobile Phone 70 44.64 54.73 2.67 2.88
Phone 71 80.80 82.08 4.13 3.29
TV 71 131.10 206.03 3.38 3.76
TV Box 71 136.63 195.98 6.69 9.58
Note: Returns in this table do not including same months returns.
Table 4.6: Monthly Sales and Returns (Jewelry Dataset)
Sales Returns
Category Months Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Accessories 16 1,102.39 893.31 27.83 28.45
Bracelets 16 3,211.00 1,285.31 152.11 80.20
Earrings 16 15,425.94 7,111.96 835.22 475.11
Necklaces 16 13,593.67 4,874.56 648.28 291.82
Rings 16 2,761.11 1,293.78 155.56 105.94
Note: Returns in this table do not including same months returns.
Figure 4.3: Histogram of Return Lags
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4.5 Forecasting Performance
We demonstrate the performance of our proposed P-A forecasting approach for con-
sumer returns in two steps. First, we describe two commonly used benchmark models
and evaluate their performance against the basic version of our approach from §4.3.3.
Second, we evaluate the forecasting performance after adding heteroskedasticity and
sample selection, one at a time, against the basic model to show the value of these
additional model components.
4.5.1 Benchmark Models
As discussed in §4.3.1, the existing forecasting approaches follow the A-P work flow,
where prediction is carried out at the period-level. Two representative prediction
models are ARIMA (often used in practice) and Lagged Sales (often discussed in the
end-of-use returns forecasting literature). Both A-P approaches first use the purchase
and return timestamps to compute the monthly sales and return quantities (the
aggregate step), and then apply either a time-series model on the return quantities
or a lagged sales regression model on both quantities. The fitted model is in turn
used to predict future return quantities (the predict step). Next, we outline these
two steps in more detail.
The monthly sales, Sj, is a simple count of purchases within each month. Rj is a
simple count of returns from purchases made in previous months. Table 4.5 provides
a by-category view of the period-level variables. This completes the aggregate step.
Moving on to the prediction step, in the first method we fit an ARIMA(p,d,q)
model to the historical monthly return data. The need for differencing (i.e. d = 1 or
d = 0) is determined by a unit root test. Since none of our return time-series show an
obvious trend, the test confirms our intuition that no differencing is needed and thus
d = 0. To determine the appropriate autoregressive parameter, p, and the moving
average parameter, q, we use a stepwise model selection procedure as documented in
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Hyndman and Khandakar (2008), which is implemented in the auto.arima command
in R. The most frequently chosen model is ARIMA(1,0,0) such that Rj = α0 +
α1Rj−1 + ej.
In the second method, we regress monthly returns on past sales, which is referred
to as the Lagged Sales model in the literature (Toktay et al., 2000; De Brito and
Dekker, 2003; Clottey et al., 2012). The rationale for this model is that the returns
in a given month are attributed to sales made in previous months, where the central
question is how far back to look. The 99th percentile of return lag in our data is 150
days for our electronics data and 91 for our jewelry data set. As a result, we include
the past five months’ sales in our model for the electronics forecast and three months
for the jewelry model. The Lagged Sales model is given by Rj = α0+
∑5
k=1 αkSj−k+ej
and implemented with the lm command in R. Both the ARIMA and the Lagged Sales
models are “trained” on the first 35 months’ of data for the electronic transactions
and 9 months for the jewelry data set. The remaining periods are reserved as the
prediction sample (i.e. a half-half division for the training and prediction samples).
We employ two prediction accuracy measures: the mean absolute error (MAE)
and the root mean squared error (RMSE). While the former reflects the average








(R̂j −Rj)2, where J is the total number
of months as shown in Table 4.5. The results for the benchmark models are pre-
sented in Table 4.7. In general, the Lagged Sales model performs better than the
ARIMA model, which is expected since the former uses both sales and returns to
calibrate the model and also has a better theoretical motivation. Next, we compare
the performance of these A-P approaches to our P-A approach.
93
Table 4.7: Comparison of the Aggregate-Predict and Basic Predict-Aggregate Approaches (Electronics Dataset)
ARIMA Lagged Sales Basic P-A Basic P-A vs ARIMA Basic P-A vs L. S.
MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE
Audio 4.11 5.97 3.95 5.68 3.42 5.55 -16.9% -7.0% -13.4% -2.2%
Auto Parts 3.34 4.50 2.97 3.84 2.77 3.57 -17.2% -20.7% -6.8% -7.2%
Cable 3.95 5.55 2.60 3.74 2.29 3.27 -42.0% -41.1% -12.0% -12.8%
Computer 5.28 8.09 5.01 7.59 4.36 6.78 -17.4% -16.2% -12.8% -10.7%
Imaging 3.32 4.25 2.44 2.92 2.14 2.80 -35.3% -34.0% -11.9% -4.1%
Mobile Phone 2.61 3.61 2.66 3.69 2.55 3.73 -2.2% 3.5% -4.0% 1.2%
Phone 2.50 3.60 2.44 3.49 2.15 3.32 -14.0% -7.9% -12.0% -5.0%
TV 1.95 3.28 1.87 3.20 2.00 3.76 2.5% 14.6% 7.0% 17.3%
TV Box 5.13 11.19 4.17 10.07 4.01 9.61 -21.9% -14.1% -3.9% -4.6%
Simple Avg. -18.3% -13.7% -7.8% -3.1%
Weighted Avg. -17.7% -13.3% -7.9% -3.5%
Abbreviations: L.S. = Lagged Sales; Avg. = Average. The percentages are calculated as P-A measure
divided by A-P measure minus one. Weighted average is calculated as percentage measures weighted by categorical return rates.
Table 4.8: Comparison of the Aggregate-Predict and Basic Predict-Aggregate Approaches (Jewelry Dataset)
ARIMA Lagged Sales Basic P-A Basic P-A vs ARIMA Basic P-A vs L. S.
MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE
Accessories 23.81 27.13 6.24 6.85 5.16 6.10 -78.3% -77.5% -17.3% -10.9%
Bracelets 93.24 103.08 75.03 88.27 25.08 30.77 -73.1% -70.2% -66.6% -65.1%
Earrings 466.59 643.32 253.25 389.66 164.90 224.61 -64.7% -65.1% -34.9% -42.4%
Necklaces 324.05 337.90 230.32 248.69 98.90 131.97 -69.5% -60.9% -57.1% -46.9%
Rings 54.43 68.04 47.93 57.29 21.69 28.38 -60.1% -58.3% -54.7% -50.5%
Simple Average -69.1% -66.4% -46.1% -43.2%
Weighted Average -67.9% -65.1% -48.9% -46.5%
Abbreviations: L.S. = Lagged Sales; Avg. = Average. The percentages are calculated as P-A measure
divided by A-P measure minus one. Weighted average is calculated as percentage measures weighted by categorical return rates.
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4.5.2 Comparison between P-A and A-P Approaches
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 contains the performance comparison between the basic P-A from
§4.3.3 approach and the two A-P approaches (ARIMA and Lagged Sales). As shown
in Figure 4.4, our basic P-A approach outperforms the baseline models in most prod-
uct categories. Two exceptions are the phone and TV categories from the electronics
dataset, where the Lagged Sales Model performs better. However, as we introduce
more sophistication into our approach, these exceptions disappear.
In general, we observe that the reductions in forecast error from the basic P-A
approach are more significant for the jewelry data set than the electronics data set.
There are several potential causes for the differences in performance as summarized
in Figure 4.5. First, we observe more volatility in the monthly return rate for the
jewelry dataset than the electronic data. The average coefficient of variation for
return rate is 3.87 for the jewelry data and 2.72 for the electronic dataset. Recall
that the baseline ARIMA model only uses past returns to predict future returns, while
the lagged sales model leverages both sales and returns. As a result, both models
may be prone to error when there is significant variability in the sales-to-returns
patterns and return rates. However, our P-A forecasting approach explicitly controls
for differences in individual consumers’ return probabilities, a key source of return
variability not captured by the ARIMA and Lagged Sales models. As a result, we
observe significant reductions in error from the ARIMA and Lagged Sales model for
the jewelry product categories. Second, we observe a longer, less variable return lag
in the online jewelry dataset than the electronic dataset. The average return lag for
the jewelry retailer is approximately 24 days, CV = 0.78 and 15 days, CV = 2.0 for
the electronic retailer. We suspect that the jewelry data’s higher and more consistent
average return lag (due in part, to the presence of a return policy) decreases the
likelihood that products will be returned across multiple months and allows for easier
prediction. Last, the performance gain from the P-A model is likely to be affected
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Figure 4.4: Graphical Comparison of the A-P and Basic P-A Approaches
by our data sets’ respective sample sizes. Specifically, the higher purchase frequency
observed in the jewelry data set likely allows for further reductions in forecasting
error.
To summarize, our basic P-A approach demonstrates an accuracy improvement
over the baseline models when applied to both the electronic and jewelry data sets.
Specifically, the basic P-A approach reduces forecast error by 3% to 18% on average
for the electronic data, and by 43% to 69% for the jewelry data set, depending on
the benchmark model and error estimated used. We suspect that the improvement
in forecasting error is likely more pronounced for product categories with higher
variability in return rate and less variability in return lag.
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Figure 4.5: Summary of Key Metrics Effects’ on P-A Model Accuracy
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4.6 Extensions
In this section, we consider a number of extensions to the previous analyses. These
extensions accomplish two goals: generalizing our proposed forecasting approach, and
examining its performance over the benchmark models in different applications. To
facilitate a succinct exposition, we discuss our motivation for and the main insights
from each extension in the following, while providing the empirical details in the
appendices. We note that the extensions are only performed on the electronics data
set.
4.6.1 Heteroskedasticity of Return Probability and Sample Selection
To relax the assumption that the return probability, P rij, is homogeneous across all
purchases, we use a Probit regression such that P rij = Φ(
µr
σr
), where Φ(·) is the CDF
of a standard normal distribution. Again, this distributional restriction is relaxed in
§4.6.2. In this case, consumers return when µr + εr > 0 and keep when µr + εr < 0,
where the error term follows a zero mean normal distribution εr ∼ N (0, σr). Recall
that the only input information we have are the purchase and return timestamps.
Therefore, we provide a time-related motivation for this heterogeneous return proba-
bility. Since products purchased during the holiday season (November and December)
are more likely to be gifts, and evaluating what others might like is more difficult than
choosing the best product for oneself, these holiday season purchases should have a
wider experience variation, which is captured by σr. Identification of the Probit re-
gression requires σr be set to a fixed number (usually 1) if it is a constant. We set
σr for the non-holiday purchases to 1 and allow it to be estimated for the holiday
purchases. Essentially, we estimate a heteroskedastic Probit model, which is imple-
mented through the hetglm command in R. The probability P dij is estimated in the
same manner as in the basic model.
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Adding Sample Selection.
In our context, the experience duration is manifested only in a selected sample – as
the return lag of the returned purchases. Under the assumption behind the basic
model that a consumer’s decision to return a product is independent of the length
of her product trial, estimating experience duration from this selected sample will
not introduce bias because the mechanism that “selects” the sample (i.e. keep versus
return decision) is uncorrelated with the outcome to be estimated from the selected
sample (i.e. experience duration). However, there are reasonable arguments for why
these two events may be correlated, in both the negative and positive directions. For
example, consumers who face “buyer’s remorse” might be more likely to return the
product and also be more likely to end the product trial early – a negative correlation.
On the other hand, a perfectionist spends a long time testing the product, while her
perfectionism may also cause even small mismatches between her expectations and
the product’s functionality to result in a product return – a positive correlation. This
correlation will bias the estimation of experience duration and hence P dij. Further,
for forecasting purposes, the implication of a non-zero correlation between the return
decision and experience duration is that Pij = P rij × P dij no longer holds. As a result,
we must specify a bivariate distribution for Pij, which incorporates the correlation
between the two events. Recall that the error terms for the return regression and
the duration regression, εr and εd, are both normally distributed. Therefore, their
correlation can be incorporated through a bivariate normal distribution such that







. This setup is commonly referred to as
a sample selection model (Heckman, 1979) in econometrics. Note that a sample
selection model is not the same as the conventional censored regression model and
the latter does not fit our problem (see Appendix C.3 for a detailed explanation).
To estimate this model, we proceed with a Maximum Likelihood (ML) method.
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Let Ii be the return indicator. If purchase i is not returned, the likelihood is simply




If purchase i is returned, we know two things: the return lag is di and µr + εr > 0. The
likelihood in this case is therefore
















{(1− Ii)× Li|Ii=0 + Ii × Li|Ii=1} (4.3)
Again, σr is estimated for the holiday purchases and set to 1 for the non-holiday purchases,
which incorporates heteroskedasticity in the return probability regression. The above model
is implemented through the bbmle package in R.
After estimating the parameters (µr, µd, σr, σd, and ρ), the probability for each purchase
to be returned in month j is given by







where Fr,d(·) is the bivariate normal distribution for the two error terms (calculation
implemented in R’s pmvnorm command). The aggregate monthly returns are then obtained
by summing these Pij ’s. In the next section, we describe the data set we use to test the
performance of our proposed approach.
We present the additional accuracy gain caused by the inclusion of heteroskedasticity
(denoted by Het.) over the basic P-A model in Appendix C.2. The average accuracy gain is
around 6% (Table C.4). While we observe an improvement in accuracy in all the categories,
it is more pronounced for products that are likely to be purchased as gifts. For example,
the accuracy gain for the audio category, a common gift choice, is between 16% and 19%.
On the other hand, auto parts and cables might be less common choices for gifts, and the
accuracy gains for these two categories are much smaller. Our primary motivation for the
addition of heteroskedastic error in §4.6 is the change in consumers’ return behavior due to
100
gifting in the holiday season. The above categorical differences in the accuracy improvement
is aligned with this motivation.
4.6.2 Arbitrary Distributions
Throughout §4.3.3, we assumed that experience duration follows a log-normal distribution,
which simplifies our analysis in two ways. First, when sample selection is not incorporated,
the parameters related to experience duration can be estimated through a linear regression.
Second, when sample selection is present, it allows us to use a bivariate normal distribution
and follow the standard (Heckman, 1979) setup to estimate model parameters. Although
the log-normal distribution fits our data set well (see Appendix C.4), there is no guarantee
that it will do so for other product returns data. To expand the flexibility of our proposed
approach, we introduce a more general setup of our econometric model in Appendix C.4
that accommodates an arbitrary distributional choice for both the return probability and
experience duration. After comparing the forecasting accuracy obtained from using an
alternative distribution with that using the normal distribution, we find no evidence that the
former dominates the latter. As a cautionary note, we stress that the “optimal distribution”
will likely vary by the data at hand. This is exactly the reason why we generalize our model
to allow for an arbitrary distributional choice.
4.6.3 Inflated Same-Day Returns
Our data exhibits a high volume of same-day returns, as shown in Figure 4.3. This could
occur for several reasons: consumers might have simply purchased the wrong item, they
might test the product immediately after purchase, or it may simply be a case of immediate
consumer remorse without an actual product trial. From a modeling standpoint, the spike
of same-day returns leads to a poor fit at the left corner for most distributions. In Appendix
C.6, we explore whether explicitly accounting for these “inflated same-day returns” improves
the forecast accuracy. The basic idea is to modify the distribution of experience duration
into a mixture of continuous and discrete components, where the discrete component helps
to better capture the spike. Our analysis reveals that paying separate attention to the same-
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day returns provides only a marginal forecasting improvement. The performance similarity
between using a continuous and a mixture distribution might be explained as follows. For
each purchase that took place before month j, we predict its probability of being returned in
the time interval [tstartj − ti, tendj − ti]. A mixture distribution should predict this probability
more accurately when tstartj is only several days ahead of ti. However, the proportion of
such purchases is very small when using our monthly buckets. Thus, if our goal had been
to estimate the probability that a purchase will be returned in two or three days, a mixture
distribution would be more likely to outperform its continuous counterpart.
4.6.4 Flexibility of Adding Transaction-Level Predictors
In §4.3.3, we only used the purchase and return timestamps in building our econometric
model, which helps to cleanly demonstrate the superiority of our proposed P-A approach
over the benchmark A-P approaches. In practice, one additional advantage of using our
proposed approach is its flexibility of incorporating additional transaction-level predictors
of return probability and experience duration. The granularity of these variables is hard
to capture in period-level models. In Appendix C.7, we include purchase price and a
holiday dummy variable into our model and observe a 1% to 4% reduction in forecast error,
depending on the econometric specification.
4.6.5 Total Number of Returns
To ensure a clean and direct comparison between the benchmarks and our approach, we
focused on predicting monthly return quantities attributed to previous months’ sales (i.e.
Rj) in §4.5.2. Now, we extend our analysis to predict the total monthly return quantities6,
Rtj . In practice, a retailer or OEM may be interested in all three quantities. While Rtj
provides a holistic view of the return flow, Rcj and Rj provide additional information on
the age of the returns. The retailer or OEM may recapture the value of newer returns
in a different way than older returns. On average, the total monthly returns are around
6Recall that Rcj denote the same month returns and Rtj denote the total number of returns in
month j such that Rtj = Rcj +Rj .
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Table 4.9: Comparison of MAE of Aggregate-Predict and Predict-Aggregate
Approaches for Forecasting Total Returns
A-P Approach P-A Approach
ARIMA Lagged Sales Het. & Sel. vs ARIMA vs Lagged Sales
Audio 9.13 9.60 6.24 -31.6% -35.0%
Auto Parts 9.07 7.26 8.18 -9.8% 12.7%
Cable 8.49 8.12 7.13 -16.0% -12.2%
Computer 10.62 10.62 9.24 -12.9% -13.0%
Imaging 6.47 6.36 5.55 -14.3% -12.8%
Mobile Phone 5.37 4.83 4.85 -9.7% 0.5%
Phone 4.73 4.83 4.12 -12.9% -14.7%
TV 5.19 5.22 4.80 -7.7% -8.2%
TV Box 9.91 9.75 8.28 -16.5% -15.0%
Simple Average -14.6% -10.9%
Weight Average -14.4% -9.9%
three times the number of returns attributed to the previous months’ sales in our data (see
Appendix C.8 for a detailed breakdown across categories).
To predict Rcj , we use the same historical timestamps for calibration, but in the predic-
tion stage, we need a forecast of the purchase pattern in month j. Since producing the sales
forecast of new purchases is outside the scope of this research, we proceed with a naïve ap-
proach – using the purchase pattern in month j−12 as the forecast of the purchase pattern
in month j. In other words, we assume consumers’ purchasing behavior repeats from the
previous year. In practice, a forecaster will most likely substitute this simple method with
their preferred sales forecasting method. Appendix C.8 describes how a forecast of total
monthly returns is computed by our proposed and the benchmark approaches. Table 4.9
presents the MAE comparison between them. The RMSE results are similar and available
upon request.
When predicting Rj , the MAE improvement of our full P-A model over the ARIMA
model is 24.5%. In the case of total returns, Rtj , the performance gap between these two
approaches narrows to 14.6%. The direction of this change is expected due to two reasons.
First, the predictive ability of the ARIMA model should be relatively stable across Rj
and Rtj , since each case uses one series of actual returns data. Second, the predictive
ability of our econometric model should be slightly lower when predicting Rtj , because a
proportion of it (i.e. the same month returns Rcj) is based not on actual purchase data but
103
on forecasts. The performance gap between the Lagged Sales model and our econometric
model also narrows, but the change is at a smaller rate. When predicting Rj , the total
MAE improvement is 14.8%. In the case of Rtj , it is 10.9%. In summary, despite the fact
that applying our proposed approach to forecast total monthly returns uses a simplistic
approach for predicting purchase patterns, its performance is still substantially better than
the benchmark approaches.
4.7 Conclusion
In recent years, retailers have often considered the design of a return policy to be as impor-
tant as product pricing in generating demand (Brill, 2015). The prevailing practice adopted
in the industry is to provide the most lenient return policy – refunding the full purchase
price upon return. The consequence of such a policy is the large volume of consumer returns
that parties along the reverse supply chain must process, with recent return rates at around
12% and on an upward trend (National Retail Federation, 2016).
The above industry status and trend increase the urgency and importance of optimizing
return-related operational activities such as inventory management, staffing of retailers’
return counters and OEMs’ refurbishing centers, reverse logistics planning, and allocation
of returns for reselling and warranty stocks. For all of these activities, an accurate returns
forecast is a critical input parameter. Although cost reduction potentials resulting from
these activities are believed to be quite promising, the topic of forecasting consumer returns
has received little attention in the academic literature.
In this paper, we present a new return forecasting framework that enables retailers
and OEMs to better leverage their transaction-level POS data. Our proposed approach
follows a predict-aggregate sequence, while existing ones are based on an aggregate-predict
sequence. With the same data input, we demonstrate that our approach substantially
outperforms existing approaches, even with a very basic setup – so basic in fact that it
could be implemented in a simple spreadsheet. In addition, by incrementally building
our forecasting model, we show the predictive value of each model component. By more
effectively utilizing transaction-level data such as purchase and return timestamps, the
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basic P-A approach reduces forecast error by 3% to 18% on average for the electronic
data, and by 43% to 69% for the jewelry data set, depending on the benchmark model
and error estimated used. Such forecast accuracy improvement presents broad implications
for inventory, staffing, reverse logistics, and return recovery disposition decisions. We also
extend our forecasting model in several directions to make it more generally applicable and
show the robustness of its superior performance in a number of empirical settings.
Our study uncovers several interesting areas for future research. First, with our data
set, we are unable to quantify the cost savings from better return forecasts, which will
depend on the current structure of the reverse supply chain. Thus, estimating these savings
under different reverse supply chain structures would be a valuable contribution. Second,
the current literature on closed loop supply chains has provided many decision support tools
for better managing consumer returns, such as Pince et al. (2016) for the OEM’s optimal
disposition between which returns to return to the market and which ones to save to meet
future warranty demand. Our study provides a methodology for improving the accuracy of
one of the key input parameters of these decision support tools – the return volume forecast.
Third, a typical idea for forecasting new product sales is to calibrate model parameters on
a sample of existing products and then apply the model to new products. Future studies
could borrow from new product sales forecasting and adapt our approach to forecast returns




The main objective of this dissertation was to advance strategies that can not only provide
economic opportunities for firms, but also reduce or eliminate the introduction of waste
into the environment. To achieve this, we empirically investigated operational challenges
associated with three preferred waste management strategies.
In Chapter 2, we evaluated the potential for demand cannibalization of refurbished prod-
ucts in a multi-generation, multi-condition setting. Fears of product cannibalization have
prevented firms from fully engaging in the remanufacturing industry, and despite noted
economic and environmental benefits, the sector remains largely underdeveloped. Using
structural estimation modeling techniques and data from over 8,000 online transactions we
showed that product generation, condition, and seller attributes are highly influential in
shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions, and that the relationship between new and re-
manufactured products is much more nuanced and context-specific than previously thought.
Counter to industry intuition, we found that remanufactured products pose the same level of
threat to new-condition goods as do used goods. Future studies may consider incorporating
expanded product types in consumers’ choice sets to draw additional insights.
In Chapter 3, we analyzed the effectiveness of legislative tools and consumer education
efforts in promoting product reuse and recycling. Although both consumer attributes and
legislation seem likely to impact e-recycling, a lack of empirical data has limited firms’ and
legislators’ ability to assess the true impact of these factors. Using survey data from 11 state
environmental agencies, we found that in states with EPR legislation, consumers are more
likely to recycle their electronic waste. Perhaps less intuitively, we found that consumers’
knowledge of landfill bans increases their likelihood to store their electronics rather than
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recycle them. Our results suggest that efforts that focus on informing consumers about the
dangers of e-waste and where they can recycle their electronic products may need to be
coupled with e-waste legislation and to significantly promote e-waste recycling. In future
studies, understanding how consumers’ e-waste behaviors may vary across product types
may be an interesting area of inquiry.
In Chapter 4, we developed a robust consumer returns forecasting model to aid op-
erations managers in inventory, reverse logistics, and return recovery decisions. Although
lenient return policies have been shown to have marketing benefits such as a higher will-
ingness to pay and a higher purchase frequency, counterbalancing these benefits with an
increased volumes of returns presents operational challenges for both retailers and original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs). To better manage consumer returns, operations man-
agers need an accurate return forecast as an input into their strategic and tactical tools.
We proposed a consumer return forecasting framework and tested our model on datasets
provided by brick-and-mortar and online retailers. Finally, we illustrated how our pro-
posed approach demonstrates significant error reduction over benchmark models found in
the literature and in practice.
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Table A.1: Robustness Check: Nested Model: IV
Estimates using 3 months of data [DV: ln(sj)− ln(s0)]
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Price −0.01∗∗∗ (1.76× 10−3)
log(sj|g) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.04)
Total Active 1.01× 10−3∗∗∗ (1.58× 10−4)
Feedback Score 1.35 (1.68)
Net Feedback Score 7.92× 10−7∗∗∗ (1.86× 10−7)
Warranty 0.06 (0.08)
Communication Score −0.02 (0.24)
Shiphand Score 5.09× 10−4 (0.26)
Shiptime Score 0.01 (0.22)
Item Description Score 0.09 (0.25)
Warranty Length −6.37× 10−4 (6.05× 10−4)
Seller Incumbency 1.16× 10−5 (7.52× 10−6)
Net Positive Score −1.63× 10−6 (1.08× 10−6)




Return ∗ Return Policy 4.61× 10−3∗∗ (1.69× 10−3)
Shipping 0.18∗ (0.07)
Shipping ∗ Shipping Fee −0.01 (0.01)
Restock 0.03 (0.15)
Restock ∗ Restock Fee −0.39 (0.84)
3G −0.05 (0.04)
4G 0.24∗∗ (0.07)
iPad Size 32 GBa 0.17∗∗∗ (0.04)
iPad Size 64 GBa 0.41∗∗∗ (0.07)
iPad Size 128 GBa 1.77∗∗∗ (0.29)
iPad Generation 2b 0.89∗∗∗ (0.12)
iPad Generation 3b 1.75∗∗∗ (0.21)
iPad Generation 4b 2.08∗∗∗ (0.28)
Intercept −7.84∗∗∗ (1.64)
a: Holdout Group: IPad Size 16 GB, b: Holdout Group: IPad Generation 1,




Table B.1: List of ERCC Members
2016-2017 ERCC Members: Membership Type
California Recycle Agency Voting
Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Voting
Hawaii State Department of Health Voting
Maine Department of Environmental Protection Voting
Maryland Department of Education Voting
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality Voting
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Voting
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Voting
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Voting
NC Department of Environmental Quality Voting
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality Voting
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Voting
Rhode Island DEM Voting
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Voting
Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation Voting
Washington DC Department of Energy and EnvironmentÊ Voting
Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Resources. Voting
Best Buy Non-voting
Barnes and Noble Non-voting
Brother International Non-voting











Pennsylvania Recycling Markets Center Non-voting









Figure B.1: Copy of ERCC Consumer Awareness Survey
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Table B.2: Odds Ratios from Ungrouped Disposal MNL Model with Trash as Reference Category
Variables Store (Std. Error) Family (Std. Error) Donate (Std. Error) ReStore (Std. Error) ReTown (Std. Error)
1. EPR: Yes 1.46 (-0.35) 1.28 (-0.3) 1.61∗∗ (-0.36) 1.53∗ (-0.38) 2.15∗∗∗ (-0.54)
2. IMPORTANCE: Not very 1.77 (-1.55) 1.05 (-0.77) 2.83 (-3.4) -0.28 (-0.28) 0.42 (-0.59)
3. IMPORTANCE: Neutral 2.18 (-1.79) 3.01∗ (-1.9) 9.17∗ (-10.48) 0.59 (-0.57) 1.75 (-1.79)
4. IMPORTANCE: Somewhat Important 9.58∗∗∗ (-7.69) 6.08∗∗∗ (-3.79) 20.42∗∗∗ (-23.2) 3.16 (-2.78) 8.35∗∗ (-8.17)
5. IMPORTANCE: Very Important 9.80∗∗∗ (-7.96) 6.69∗∗∗ (-4.18) 33.82∗∗∗ (-38.31) 6.12∗∗ (-5.31) 11.35∗∗ (-11.05)
1. INFOSOURCE: General 0.45∗∗ (-0.18) 1.07 (-0.43) 2.28∗∗ (-0.94) 1.14 (-0.6) 1.25 (-0.6)
2. INFOSOURCE: Government 0.73 (-0.3) 1.41 (-0.59) 2.47∗∗ (-1.07) 1.18 (-0.64) 3.40∗∗ (-1.66)
3. INFOSOURCE: Retailer Manufacturer 0.68 (-0.31) 1.33 (-0.61) 2.28∗ (-1.05) 2.55∗ (-1.42) 0.62 (-0.34)
4. INFOSOURCE: Non Profit 0.73 (-0.32) 2.01 (-0.89) 2.81∗∗ (-1.27) 1.94 (-1.07) 0.85 (-0.45)
1. LEGALAWARENESS: Yes 1.53∗ (-0.39) 1.18 (-0.29) 0.95 (-0.22) 1 (-0.26) 1.21 (-0.3)
1. LOCTAWARENESS: Maybe 1.23 (-0.34) 2.44∗∗∗ (-0.64) 3.53∗∗∗ (-0.89) 11.76∗∗∗ (-3.97) 6.15∗∗∗ (-1.83)
2. LOCTAWARENESS: Yes 1.13 (-0.34) 2.02∗∗ (-0.58) 3.27∗∗∗ (-0.9) 24.55∗∗∗ (-8.76) 13.55∗∗∗ (-4.23)
1. PREVENT: Too Expensive 0.5 (-0.45) 0.4 (-0.32) 0.37 (-0.3) 0.27 (-0.23) 0.21∗ (-0.17)
2. PREVENT: Inconvenient Location 0.48 (-0.42) 0.19∗∗ (-0.15) 0.25∗ (-0.19) 0.19∗∗ (-0.15) 0.11∗∗∗ (-0.09)
3. PREVENT: Unable to Transport 0.37 (-0.33) 0.31 (-0.25) 0.45 (-0.35) 0.3 (-0.25) 0.28 (-0.22)
4. PREVENT: Unaware of Location 0.47 (-0.41) 0.22∗ (-0.17) 0.25∗ (-0.19) 0.22∗ (-0.17) 0.20∗∗ (-0.16)
1. RURAL: Yes 1.16 (-0.26) 0.78 (-0.17) 0.74 (-0.15) 0.7 (-0.16) 1.02 (-0.23)
2. AGE: 36-45 1.37 (-0.44) 1.19 (-0.37) 1.54 (-0.46) 1.24 (-0.42) 2.09∗∗ (-0.74)
3. AGE: 46-55 0.42∗∗∗ (-0.13) 0.68 (-0.2) 0.8 (-0.22) 0.9 (-0.28) 3.62∗∗∗ (-1.1)
4. AGE: 56-65 0.57∗ (-0.19) 0.69 (-0.22) 1.48 (-0.44) 2.17∗∗ (-0.72) 5.30∗∗∗ (-1.77)
5. AGE: 66+ 0.59 (-0.24) 1.01 (-0.39) 1.35 (-0.49) 2.45∗∗ (-0.98) 7.31∗∗∗ (-2.86)
2. DISTANCE: 1-5 miles 0.62 (-0.25) 1.22 (-0.52) 0.92 (-0.35) 0.96 (-0.39) 1.04 (-0.42)
3. DISTANCE: 6-10 miles 1.27 (-0.51) 2.40∗∗ (-1.02) 1.78 (-0.67) 1.2 (-0.49) 1.82 (-0.73)
4. DISTANCE: 11-20 miles 0.83 (-0.35) 1.71 (-0.76) 1.43 (-0.56) 1.09 (-0.46) 1.41 (-0.58)




C.1 Data Set Construction
The original Ni et al. (2012) data set contains six transaction types, namely: product
purchase, product return, service contract purchase, service contract return, sales discount,
and miscellaneous transaction (Table 1A in Ni et al., 2012). As our proposed forecasting
framework requires only purchase and return timestamps for each transaction as data input,
we are able to use most of the transactions in Ni et al. (2012). We create the data set used
in the current study through a few screening procedures. Our goal is to subset the products
that are suitable for our analysis and make sure each transaction has the correct purchase
and return timestamps. The amount of data reduction for each screening step is presented
in Table C.1. We elaborate the screening process as follows.
Table C.1: Data Screening Process
Data Screening Step Data Reduction Sample Size
Ni et al. (2012) data set 173,262
Remove service, miscellaneous, and on-line transactions 20,035 153,227
Matching returns and discounts with purchases 27,800 125,427
Product categorization 27,009 98,418
Remove appliances and information goods 12,693 85,725
First, we remove the two service transaction types as well as the miscellaneous ones,
since it is unclear what the return policy is for the service contracts. In addition, many
service contracts were returned along with the product they were attached to. We exclude
the “miscellaneous” transactions, because they do not have product descriptions. On-line
transactions were a very small fraction (1.9%) of this retailer’s sales when the data was
gathered. As a result, we are not in a position to investigate differences between on-line
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and in-store return behavior, and hence the on-line transactions are eliminated as well.
Second, the remaining three types of observations in Ni et al. (2012) are product pur-
chase, return, and discounts. We match the 14,707 product returns with their corresponding
purchase observations, which is necessary because a purchase contains information about
whether it was returned but does not show when the return happened. In other words, if a
consumer purchases an item and then later returns it, the purchase and return timestamps
are entered in two separate observations, which need to be linked for our analysis. Similarly,
if a purchased item has a discount, the amount of discount is entered as a separate obser-
vation. To obtain the actual price paid for the discounted items, we matched the purchases
with the discounts. Next, we describe how the matching is carried out. The purchase-return
matching is not straightforward since the original data does not have an identifier variable
which directly links a purchase observation with its return observation. We resolve this
by sorting the data on certain existing variables that will make the purchase return link.
Specifically, we sorted the data by three variables – original ticket number, return indicator,
and transaction type, in descending priority. See Ni et al. (2012) for variable definitions.
Table C.2 contains an example of the outcomes of this sorting method. Note that if a pur-
chase is returned, both the purchase and the return observation have the return indicator
set to “Y”. The rationale for this sorting is straightforward – if a purchase is returned, its
return observation is now right below the purchase observation. We make two additional
checks for each matched purchase-return pair: return comes after purchase, and they have
the same price. This procedure is able to match 12,783 (87%) return observations with
their purchase counterparts. We also matched the 1,447 observations of purchase discounts
with their associated purchases. The matching strategy for the purchase-discount pairs
is similar to the purchase-return case, using the original ticket number, product ID, and
transaction type as the sorting variables. Note that there is no indicator variable to tell
whether a purchase observation is associated with a discount observation. Therefore, we
resort to product ID for matching. Again, an example is provided in Table C.2. Although
the product ID variable is missing in 24% of the observations, this set of sorting variables
matched 1,221 (84%) of the discount observations with their associated purchases. To sum-
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Table C.2: Examples of Matched Purchase-Return and Purchase-Discount Pairs
Original Ticket Number Product ID Return Indicator Transaction Type Unit Price Date
(purchase-return matching example)
Purchase 86702346281 538012 Y 1 39.99 Feb 16 2000
Return 86702346281 538012 Y 2 -39.99 Feb 17 2000
(purchase-discount matching example)
Purchase 373201712537 808789 N 1 179.99 Dec 15 2012
Discount 373201712537 808789 N 5 -4.99 Dec 15 2012
marize, the reduction of 27,800 observations in this screening step is due to three reasons:
merging of returns and discounts into purchases, missing product IDs, and missing return
indicators.
Third, we categorize products so that a separate analysis could be conducted for each
category. Note that this data set is not appropriate for product-specific analysis, since a
product on average has one return per 23 days. Our categorization is a fine-tuning on the
original categorization in Ni et al. (2012), which blends the accessories for a product along
with the product itself into the same category. For example, many products in the TV
category are in fact TV stands and cables. Table C.3 contains details of the categorization
process. Some transactions have either no or uninformative product descriptions. Along
with the transactions that do not fit into any of the categories in Table C.3, we have left
27,009 transactions uncategorized, which are removed in this screening step.
Last, we ensure that each category has a fair number of returns. The “appliances”
category has 58 returns in total, which makes it inappropriate for analysis. The “information
goods” category has a very low return rate (4.5%) and a very short return lag (10 days). In
addition, the common return policy for information goods is to not accept open-box items
for refund, which is distinct from other products. Therefore, we exclude appliances and
information goods from our final sample for the forecasting analysis.
C.2 Heteroskedasticity and Sample Selection Models
The forecasting accuracy of the full model, after further adding in sample selection, is also
presented in Table C.4 (denoted by Het. & Sel.). The accuracy gain in this case shows a
steady increase from the previous case where dependence between the return probability
125
Table C.3: Product Categorization
Category Observations Percentage Subcategory No. in Appendix I in Ni et al. (2012)
Appliances 1,674 1.33% 128, 129, 200, 210, 215, 219, 220, 221, 230, 232,
239, 240, 253, 254, 305, 306, 312, 315, 318, 319,
321, 329, 355, 600
Audio 11,367 9.06% 132, 272, 273, 393, 605, 609
Auto Parts 7,211 5.75% 108, 110, 111, 123, 124, 142, 143, 170
Cable 9,398 7.49% 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 334, 389, 390, 391
Computer 21,811 17.39% 400, 401, 402, 405, 410, 415, 420, 425, 427, 430,
435, 440, 475, 480, 525
Imaging 7,823 6.24% 274, 275, 276, 277, 279, 282, 283, 288, 289, 290,
291, 298
Information Goods 11,019 8.79% 1, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 38, 41, 43, 45, 47, 56,
65, 74, 77, 376, 377, 380, 384, 392, 502, 503, 504,
505, 506, 507, 508
Mobile Phone 3,126 2.49% 323, 338, 366, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 383,
387, 395, 397, 398, 591
Phone 5,777 4.61% 320, 360, 362, 363, 365, 382, 386
TV 9,413 7.50% 100, 102, 103, 104, 117, 120, 121, 125, 126, 127,
130, 131, 172, 174, 263, 347
TV Box 9,799 7.81% 292, 294, 295, 296, 304
Not Categorized 27,009 21.53%
Total 125,427 100.00%
Description for each subcategory are in Appendix I in Ni et al. (2012). “Auto parts” are off-market
speaker, video, and GPS systems for cars. “TV box” are recorder, DVR, VCR, DVD player, and other
box-shaped items that connect to TV.
and experience duration is not incorporated. Unlike the heteroskedasticity-only model,
however, the dependence between the two events appears to apply similarly to all product
categories.
Table C.4: Comparison within the Predict-Aggregate Approach
Het. Het. vs Basic Het. & Sel. Het. & Sel. vs Basic
MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE
Audio 2.84 4.54 -16.9% -18.3% 2.48 3.96 -27.4% -28.7%
Auto Parts 2.72 3.52 -1.8% -1.3% 2.70 3.50 -2.5% -1.9%
Cable 2.28 3.25 -0.3% -0.3% 2.30 3.29 0.7% 0.8%
Computer 4.03 6.32 -7.7% -6.8% 4.07 6.17 -6.6% -9.0%
Imaging 1.96 2.53 -8.4% -9.7% 1.95 2.55 -9.0% -9.1%
Mobile Phone 2.40 3.49 -6.0% -6.5% 2.38 3.45 -7.0% -7.5%
Phone 2.13 3.25 -1.0% -2.2% 2.16 3.32 0.5% 0.2%
TV 1.90 3.38 -5.1% -10.1% 1.82 3.17 -8.7% -15.5%
TV Box 3.81 9.06 -5.0% -5.6% 3.69 8.52 -7.9% -11.3%
Simple Avg. -5.8% -6.8% -7.6% -9.1%
Weighted Avg. -5.6% -6.4% -7.3% -8.6%
Abbreviations: Het. = Heteroskedasticity; Sel. = Selection; Avg. = Average. The percentages
are calculated as het. (or het. & sel.) measures divided by basic measures minus one. Weighted
average is calculated as percentage measures weighted by categorical return rates (see Table 4.3).
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C.3 Sample Selection versus Censored Regression (Tobit) Models
Although both models deal with some form of missing information in the data, they are
fundamentally different, the key of which is the variable that determines the censoring rule.
Suppose the data generating process (i.e. population regression) is y = βx+ ε. The Tobit
model deals with the situation where the dependent variable y is “cut off” at a specific
value, e.g. 0. In this case, we observe y for y > 0 and observe 0 for y ≤ 0. In other words,
the censoring rule of y is defined by y itself. However, the sample selection model deals with
a situation where y is unobserved because of a “third variable” – a variable outside the x-y
relationship. Moreover, when y is unobserved, we do not have any information on the value
of y (e.g. whether it is greater or smaller than zero). In our context, experience duration is
not censored by itself but by the decision to return. When an item is returned, we observe
its experience duration. Otherwise, we have no information on experience duration. Thus,
we employ the sample selection model, but not the Tobit model.
C.4 Predict-Aggregate Approach with Arbitrary Distributions
In the following, we describe a copula-based approach to generalize the distributional choice
in the prediction model of our P-A approach. This relaxation is most important for the
duration part, since the return probability is modeled through a binary choice and the com-
mon distributional choices, normal and logistic, produce highly similar results. Therefore,
we demonstrate the general setup by choosing an alternative distribution for experience
duration, while staying with the normal distribution for return probability. Specifically,
the generalized gamma distribution is chosen from a set of commonly used distributions for
time data based on likelihood ratio tests. A side benefit of generalizing the distributional
choice is that we are able to directly test how well the distributions suggested by Hess and
Mayhew (1997) work in our data. Specifically, they use a logit model for return probability
and a five-parameter survival distribution for experience duration.
Let ri be the latent variable that determines the return-versus-keep decision, such that
ri > 0 for returns and ri < 0 for keeps. Its PDF and CDF are denoted by fr and Fr.
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The PDF and CDF for experience duration, di, are fd and Fd, respectively. If dependence
between return probability and experience duration is ignored (i.e. corr(ri, di) = 0), ri and
di are estimated separately, which is straightforward. To account for the dependence, we
resort to the copula approach that creates the bivariate CDF, Fr,d, from the two marginal
CDFs, Fr and Fd. The copula approach is commonly used in the econometric literature
to accommodate sample selection models with non-normal marginal distributions (e.g. Lee,
1983; Prieger, 2002; Smith, 2003). Specifically, Fr,d = C(Fr, Fd; θ), where C(·, ·; θ) is called
the copula function and the θ parameter measures the correlation between ri and di. We






, which is both simple to
estimate and stable in our data. See Smith (2003) for a review of different copula functions
for the sample selection model.
Next, we are ready to construct the ML estimator, using the same flow as in §4.6.1.
For the kept purchases, the likelihood is Li|Ii=0 = Fr(0). For the returned purchases, the
likelihood is given by
Li|Ii=1 = Pr(ri > 0, di) =
eθFd(eθFr − eθ)
eθ(Fr+Fd) + eθ(1− eθFr − eθFd)
fd
where fd(di), Fd(di), and Fr(0) are abbreviated as fd, Fd, and Fr in the final expression.
See Appendix C.5 for a detailed derivation. The log-likelihood for the whole sample is
therefore: LL =
∑N
i=1{(1− Ii)Li|Ii=0 + IiLi|Ii=1}. Note that this likelihood function does
not involve pre-specified distributions and hence allows general distribution choices.
Before selecting a specific distributional choice for experience duration, we test a number
of potential candidates on the return lag data. Table C.5 shows the log-likelihood of these
fitted distributions. The increment in log-likelihood from the one-parameter exponential
distribution to the two-parameter Weibull is fairly large. In addition, while both involves
two parameters, the log-normal distribution clearly fits our data better than Weibull, sig-
nified by the uniformly higher log-likelihoods across categories. Therefore, the log-normal
distribution appears to be a good choice if we use a duration distribution that involves
two or fewer parameters. To explore whether adding more “flexibility” to the duration dis-
tribution is beneficial, we also fitted the three-parameter generalized gamma distribution
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Table C.5: Log-Likelihood of Different Distributions Fitted to Return Lags
One Parameter Two Parameters Three Parameters
Exponential Weibull Log-Normal Generalized Gamma
Audio -4779 -4737 -4662 -4661
Auto Parts -4291 -4003 -3886 -3879*
Cable -3461 -3410 -3297 -3281*
Computer -8116 -7961 -7697 -7650*
Imaging -2920 -2894 -2839 -2838
Mobile Phone -2238 -2057 -1999 -1995*
Phone -3127 -3067 -2999 -2996
TV -2807 -2749 -2678 -2664*
TV Box -4997 -4896 -4773 -4766*
* Likelihood ratio test between generalized gamma and log-normal distributions
is significant at p = 0.01 level.
(the PDF and CDF for this distribution are given in Prentice (1974); accessible through
the flexsurv package in R). The increase in log-likelihood caused by this additional pa-
rameter appears to be more pronounced in certain categories. Since generalized gamma
nests log-normal as a special case, we implement a likelihood ratio test to examine whether
the additional goodness-of-fit provided by the former is statistically significant (significance
indicated by stars in Table C.5). Indeed, significance is found in certain categories.
In the following, we proceed with the generalized gamma distribution to illustrate the
P-A approach with arbitrary distributions. For the return decision, we still use the normal
distribution. The probability of transaction i being returned during month j is given by






The estimation of the likelihood function and calculation of Pij are implemented through
R’s bbmle and copula packages, respectively.
We compare the forecasting accuracy of using the generalized gamma distribution for
experience duration against using the log-normal distribution. We do this comparison for
the three scenarios shown in §4.3.3 to §4.6.1. The results are presented in Table C.6. Since
MAE and RMSE results are similar, we present the former, with the latter are available upon
request. We observe that increasing the “distributional flexibility” in experience duration
does not yield significantly better forecasts in our data. Specifically, while the generalized
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Table C.6: Comparison of MAE of Predict-Aggregate Approaches with Log-Normal
and Generalized Gamma Distributions for Experience Duration
Panel A: Basic Panel B: Het. Panel C: Het. & Sel.
L. N. G. G. Diff. L. N. G. G. Diff. L. N. G. G. Diff.
Audio 3.42 3.41 -0.1% 2.84 2.81 -1.0% 2.48 2.82 13.6%
Auto Parts 2.77 2.71 -2.0% 2.72 2.69 -1.0% 2.70 2.69 -0.4%
Cable 2.29 2.28 -0.6% 2.28 2.27 -0.6% 2.30 2.27 -1.7%
Computer 4.36 4.33 -0.8% 4.03 4.10 1.9% 4.07 4.12 1.2%
Imaging 2.14 2.14 -0.1% 1.96 1.96 -0.1% 1.95 1.97 0.7%
Mobile Phone 2.55 2.50 -2.2% 2.40 2.35 -2.1% 2.38 2.35 -1.1%
Phone 2.15 2.15 0.3% 2.13 2.13 0.1% 2.16 2.13 -1.3%
TV 2.00 1.95 -2.3% 1.90 1.87 -1.7% 1.82 1.87 2.3%
TV Box 4.01 3.98 -0.7% 3.81 3.79 -0.5% 3.69 3.79 2.7%
Simple Average -1.0% -0.6% 1.8%
Weighted Average -1.0% -0.6% 1.6%
gamma distribution performs better in the basic and heteroskedastic scenarios (Panels A
and B), its performance is lower in the last scenario (Panel C). In addition, the performance
difference is very small across all scenarios. Therefore, the log-normal distribution appears
to be a good choice for our data.
Hess and Mayhew (1997) suggest the use of a logit regression for estimating the re-
turn probability, P rij = e
µr
1+eµr , and a five-parameter non-negative distribution for estimating the















−t2 is the error function. As
discussed above, using the three-parameter generalized gamma distribution for experience duration
does not clearly outperform the more parsimonious two-parameter log-normal distribution in fore-
casting returns with our data. In addition, the predictive ability of probit and logit regressions are
often similar. Therefore, adding further flexibility into the duration distribution, as in Hess and
Mayhew (1997), is not expected to improve forecasting accuracy with our data. Since they do not
consider heteroskedasticity or sample selection, we explore the forecasting performance of their dis-
tributions with the basic model in §4.3.3. Table C.7 contains a comparison between the forecasting
accuracy of “probit & log-normal distributions” (those used in §4.3.3) and “Hess and Mayhew (1997)
distributions.” We removed the mobile phone category because the ML estimation of the Hess and
Mayhew (1997) duration distribution did not converge in this case. Performance between the two
distribution sets is very similar across most of the categories. However, the five-parameter duration
distribution appears to overfit our data for the auto parts and TV categories, which is evident by
the higher MAE and RMSE measures.
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MAE RMSE MAE RMSE MAE RMSE
Audio 3.42 5.55 3.38 5.61 -1.2% 1.0%
Auto Parts 2.77 3.57 2.86 3.79 3.4% 6.2%
Cable 2.29 3.27 2.29 3.26 0.0% -0.2%
Computer 4.36 6.78 4.43 6.85 1.5% 1.1%
Imaging 2.14 2.80 2.16 2.86 1.0% 2.1%
Phone 2.15 3.32 2.18 3.42 1.5% 3.1%
TV 2.00 3.76 2.07 4.06 3.4% 8.0%
TV Box 4.01 9.61 3.98 9.49 -0.7% -1.2%
Simple Average 1.1% 2.5%
Weighted Average 1.1% 2.4%
C.5 Derivations
Derivations for §4.6.1. Pr(εr > −µr∪εd = log(di)−µd) = fd(log(di−µd)) Pr(εr > −µr|εd = log(di−
µd)). The first term is simply 1σdφ(
log(di)−µd
σd
), while evaluating the second terms requires invoking
the property of the conditional bivariate normal distribution. Conditional on εd = log(di − µd), εr




(log(di)− µd), σ2r(1− ρ2)
)











). Assembling the two terms yields the expression
in (4.2).
Derivations for Appendix C.4. Pr(ri > 0, di) = Pr(ri > 0)fd|r(di|ri > 0), where the latter term is










1−Fr . Applying the chain rule to
∂C(Fr,Fd;θ)
∂di




Therefore, Pr(ri > 0, di) = fd − ∂C(Fr,Fd;θ)∂Fd . Plugging in the expression of C(Fr, Fd; θ) and simpli-
fying the partial derivative, we obtain Pr(ri > 0, di) = e
θFd (eθFr−eθ)
eθ(Fr+Fd)+eθ(1−eθFr−eθFd )fd.
C.6 Predict-Aggregate Approach with Inflated Same-Day Returns
In §4.3.3, we assumed that consumers’ experience duration, di, follows a log-normal distribution,
regardless of how short it is. To give the same-day returns a special treatment, we modify this
distribution to allow for a discrete point at di = 1 with probability φ. For di > 1, we still assume
it is log-normally distributed. Essentially, we have modified the distribution of experience duration
into a mixture of continuous and discrete components. Since incorporating the dependence between
return probability and experience duration requires a continuous distribution for the latter, we
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Table C.8: Comparison of MAE of Predict-Aggregate Approaches with
Continuous and Mixture Distributions for Experience Duration
Panel A: Basic Panel B: Heteroskedastic
Continuous Mixture Difference Continuous Mixture Difference
Audio 3.42 3.43 0.4% 2.84 2.83 -0.3%
Auto Parts 2.77 2.72 -1.7% 2.72 2.67 -1.7%
Cable 2.29 2.28 -0.3% 2.28 2.28 -0.3%
Computer 4.36 4.30 -1.4% 4.03 3.96 -1.8%
Imaging 2.14 2.14 -0.2% 1.96 1.96 -0.3%
Mobile Phone 2.55 2.57 0.7% 2.40 2.42 0.7%
Phone 2.15 2.14 -0.4% 2.13 2.12 -0.5%
TV 2.00 1.99 -0.6% 1.90 1.88 -0.7%
TV Box 4.01 4.02 0.2% 3.81 3.81 0.2%
Simple Average -0.4% -0.5%
Weight Average -0.3% -0.5%
restrict the above modification to the basic and heteroskedastic models. Table C.8 presents the
results. It appears that paying separate attention to the same-day returns provides only a marginal
improvement in forecasting accuracy; the MAE reduction is less than 1% under both the basic and
heteroskedastic models.
C.7 Predict-Aggregate Approach with Additional Predictors
We linearly parameterize the mean of the return utility, µr, and the mean of the logged experience
duration, µd. Let µr = Xβ and µd = Zγ, where X and Z are exogenous variables, and β and γ
are coefficient vectors. We include a purchase price variable in X and Z, and also a holiday dummy
variable in Z. We do not include the holiday dummy in X because the holiday effect in return prob-
ability is already captured by the heteroskedasticity and entering it again in X results in over fitting.
Results are presented in Table C.9. As shown by the percentage differences, the additional informa-
tion contained in the exogenous variables increases the accuracy of returns forecasting. In addition,
the forecast error reduction is most substantive with the basic Predict-Aggregate approach (e.g.
the simple average is 3.9%) and decreases as the model specification becomes more sophisticated.
Therefore, the accuracy gain increases at a diminishing rate as the overall model sophistication
increases.
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Table C.9: Comparison of MAE of Predict-Aggregate Approaches with and without Additional Predictors
Without Exogenous Vars With Exogenous Vars Difference
Basic Het. Het. & Sel. Basic Het. Het. & Sel. Basic Het. Het. & Sel.
Audio 3.42 2.84 2.48 3.08 2.52 2.52 -9.9% -11.3% 1.7%
Auto Parts 2.77 2.72 2.70 2.72 2.70 2.70 -1.9% -0.8% 0.0%
Cable 2.29 2.28 2.30 2.11 2.12 2.12 -7.7% -7.0% -7.9%
Computer 4.36 4.03 4.07 4.24 4.14 4.14 -2.8% 2.7% 1.6%
Imaging 2.14 1.96 1.95 2.10 1.95 1.95 -2.0% -0.9% -0.2%
Mobile Phone 2.55 2.40 2.38 2.52 2.36 2.35 -1.4% -1.7% -1.1%
Phone 2.15 2.13 2.16 2.14 2.13 2.13 -0.3% 0.2% -1.2%
TV 2.00 1.90 1.82 1.91 1.82 1.81 -4.7% -4.1% -0.6%
TV Box 4.01 3.81 3.69 3.84 3.72 3.72 -4.2% -2.3% 0.8%
Simple Average -3.9% -2.8% -0.8%
Weighted Average -3.6% -2.6% -0.7%
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Audio 18.44 12.00 6.44 34.9%
Auto Parts 14.51 9.52 4.99 34.4%
Cable 13.93 10.46 3.46 24.9%
Computer 32.41 23.68 8.73 26.9%
Imaging 11.35 7.44 3.92 34.5%
Mobile Phone 7.27 4.60 2.67 36.7%
Phone 11.44 7.31 4.13 36.1%
TV 11.17 7.79 3.38 30.3%
TV Box 18.63 11.94 6.69 35.9%
Average 15.46 10.53 4.93 32.7%
C.8 Forecasting Total Monthly Returns
Table C.10 contains descriptive statistics for the three return quantities. We use the same econo-
metric setup as in §4.6.1 for our P-A approach. It follows that the probability of each purchase
made in month j being returned in the same month is obtained by modifying (4.4) such that




−µr Fr,d(εr, εd)dεrdεd. Then, R
c
j is simply
the sum of all these probabilities. Rj is predicted the same way as in §4.6.1. Thus, our P-A forecast
of Rtj is obtained by adding up Rcj and Rj . Forecasting Rtj with the aggregate models (ARIMA and
Lagged Sales) are rather straightforward. We replace the series of Rj with Rtj and then proceed in
the same manner as in §4.5.1.
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